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Sweatt v. Painter, the End of Segregation, and
the Transformation of Education Law
Jonathan L. Entin*
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education 1
was a watershed event. In that unanimous ruling, the Court repudiated two of its most embarrassing opinions: Scott v. Sandford,2 which suggested that blacks had no rights which whites
were bound to respect, and Pless_v v. Ferguson, 3 which endorsed the
"separate but equal" doctrine. Brown has rightly been called
"probably the most important American governmental act of any
kind since the Emancipation Proclamation." 4 This landmark case
not only made clear that officially supported racial discrimination
violated the Constitution, but it also served as a catalyst for the
modern civil rights movement, leading to sweeping changes in
American law and society. 5
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I have accumulated numerous personal and intellectual debts in the course of this project. Victor G.
Rosenblum encouraged my initial curiosity about the Sweatt case. This Article could not
have been written without his wise and generous counsel. Judge A. Leon Higginbotham,Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit offered his support
and assistance to this work at a crucial stage. John T. Hubbell kindly shared his knowledge of the desegregation of the University of Oklahoma with me. The staff of the Case
Western Reserve law library, especially Pat Harris, Dan Kowal, and Rosanna Masley,
performed herculean "feats in response to my never-ending requests for information. My
colleagues Melvyn Durchslag and William P. Marshall offered a number of useful suggestions on an earlier draft. I thank all of them for their contributions and absolve each
from responsibility for the errors of omission or commission that remain.
1. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
.
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). The opinion in Brown does not mention Dred
Scott. The result in that case was, of course, effectively overruled by the Civil War and by
the thirteenth amendment. Consequently, the Court never was forced to repudiate that
decision and had not done so before 1954. Both the result and the reasoning of Brown,
however, mark a complete rejection of that old case.
3. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
4. 2 THE CoNSTITUTION AND THE SuPREME CouRT: A DocuMENTARY HrsTORY 266
(L. Pollak ed. 1966); see also Pollak, Thurgood Marshall: Lawyer and justice, 40 Mn. L. REv.
405,406 (1981) ("assuredly the most important litigation of any kind in any court since
the Civil War").
5. The Court promptly extended Brown in a series of per curiam orders to find
racial segregation unconstitutional in a variety of other contexts. New Orleans City Park
3
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At the time, however, Brown was intensely controversial. Critics denounced the Court for arbitrarily and abruptly overturning
Plessy on the basis of fuzzy sociological theories rather than legal
Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (municipal parks); Gayle v. Browder,
352 U.S. 903 (1956) (city buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches).
More significantly, however, much of the constitutional jurisprudence of the past generation, particularly with respect to free speech, has arisen in the context of civil rights
activities that took place in the wake of Brown. E.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886 (1982); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Walker
v. City ofBirmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex mi. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 ( 1958). See generally H. KALVEN,jR., THE NEGRO AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).
Among the federal statutes that were adopted after Brown, and as a result of forces
set in motion by that decision, are the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71
Stat. 634 (1957) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 28 & 42 U.S.C. (1982));
the Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449,74 Stat. 86 (1960) (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 20 & 42 U.S.C. (1982)); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of28 & '12 U.S.C. (1982));
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1982)); and the Civil Rights Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18, 25, 28 & 42 U.S.C. (1982)).
In the generation following Bmwn, blacks have made significant progress and
gained increased opportunities in education and employment, although substantial racial differentials remain. See generally R. FARLEY, BLACKS AND WHITES: NARROWING THE
GAP? (1984); P. BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, jOBS, AND POLITICS 125-54 (1985); D.
FEATHERMAN & R. HAUSER, OPPORTUNITY AND CHANGE 313-84 (1978); W. WILSON, THE
DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 88-164 (2d ed. 1980).
Moreover, blacks have made important political breakthroughs during the same period. Both the number and the proportion of eligible blacks registered to vote have
increased dramatically since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. S. REP. No.
417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, TepTintedin 1982 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &AD. NEWS 177, 183; M.
BARONE & G. Uj!FUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1984, at 639 (1983);
O'Rourke, Voting Rights .tlct Amendments of 1982: The New Bailout Provision and ViTginia, 69
VA. L. REV. 765, 769-70 (1983). In addition, the number of black elected officials increased from no more than 280 in 1964 to 4,607 in 1979. Eisinger, Black Employment in
Municipal jobs: The impact of Blacil Political PoweT, 76 AM. PoL. Scr. REV. 380, 380 n.1
(1982). To put the matter in more graphic terms, George Wallace and Strom Thurmond, both of whom came to power as diehard segregationists, actively sought black
support in their last campaigns, and neither might have been elected without that support. M. BARONE & G. UJIFUSA, supra, at 2, 1062; Chris. Sci. Monitor, Nov. 4, 1982, at
13, col. 1 (midwestern ed.); N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1983, at I, col. 2. Indeed, Wallace
issued a formal proclamation on the occasion of the first observance of the birthday of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., as a federal holiday and had it read from the very spot from
which he had promised to maintain "segregation forever" in his first inaugural speech in
1963. Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 1986, at AI.
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principles and for usurping the legislative function of the states. 6
In fact, Brown marked the culmination of a carefully planned litigation strategy that was designed to chip away at "separate but
equal" one step at a time. 7 The most significant of these preliminary cases was Sweatt v. Painter, 8 which effectively outlawed segregated law schools and "extensively undermine[d]" 9 the "separate
but equal" doctrine. Yet the critics never mentioned these earlier decisions. Today, when Brown seems a settled part of American jurisprudence, 10 those cases have faded from memory. Even
in the leading constitutional law casebooks, they are relegated to
the status of side notes if they appear at all. 11
6. E.g., Declaration of Constitutional Principles, 102 GoNG. REc. 4460-61,4515-16
(1956); R. GORDON, NINE MEN AGAINST AMERICA 79-95 (1958).
The Declaration of Constitutional Principles has come to be referred to as the
Southern Manifesto, a joint statement issued by 19 Senators and 77 Representatives on
March 12, 1956. The Manifesto denounced Brown as "clear abuse of judicial power"
and pledged support for "those States which have declared the intention to resist forced
integration by any lawful means."
One critic did recognize that some more recent decisions foreshadowed Brown, but
nevertheless regarded that ruling as having done violence to the Constitution. J. KILPATRICK, THE SOVEREIGN STATES 256-57 (1957).
7. The litigation campaign that culminated in Brown is exhaustively chronicled in R.
KLUGER, SIMPLE jUSTICE (1975).
8. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
9. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1949-50, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 36 (1950);
see also L. MILLER, THE PETITIONERS 340-41 ( 1966).
10. The strongest critics of judicial activism now recognize the continuing vitality of
Brown. No serious commentator today suggests that this decision be reconsidered,
although some would justify the ruling on grounds other than those advanced by the
Court. See, e.g., G. McDoWELL, EQ.UITY AND THE CoNSTITUTION 131-32 (1982); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 14-15 (1971). Attorney
General Edwin Meese, who argues for a constitutional jurisprudence based firmly upon
the framers' intent and who has repeatedly condemned much of the work of the modern
Supreme Court as "chameleon jurisprudence," supports Brown. He cites the Plessy decision as a prime example of the serious errors that flow from ignoring original intent.
See, e.g., Meese, Constnting the Constitution, 19 U.C.D. L. REV. 22, 27 (1985). And Raoul
Berger, who has devoted much of the past decade to arguing that the framers of the
fourteenth amendment did not intend to abolish segregation in education, repeatedly
emphasizes that he supports the result in Brown; he claims to oppose only the propriety
of judicial resolution of the controversy. R. BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY jUDICIARY 4, 8,
117, 327,342 (1977).
Even those who regarded Bmwn as wrong on the merits seem reconciled to the
decision as an enduring part of the legal landscape. For example, James J. Kilpatrick,
the editor of the editorial page of the Richmond News Leader when the case was decided, served as the intellectual architect of Massive Resistance. See J. KILPATRICK, THE
SOUTHERN CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION (1956). Today he offers "no apologies" for
his role. Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1982, at Al. Nevertheless, Kilpatrick has long since
given up the fight to overturn the ruling.
11. Sweatt is discussed in a footnote in the two most widely used casebooks. See G.
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The obscurity into which Sweatt has fallen is unfortunate for
several reasons. First, the decision was the result of extraordinary professional work by a team of outstanding lawyers. This
Symposium is an overdue occasion for recognizing their superior
efforts. Second, the Supreme Court's opinion relied heavily
upon an excellent amicus curiae brief submitted by nearly 200
law professors. Examination of that brief may yield insight into
the influence of nonparties in constitutional litigation. Third, the
rulings in Sweatt and its companion cases 12 set the stage for
Brown. Sweatt's attorneys and that influential amicus brief first
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form, would prove decisive in the school segregation decision.
As a result, the Court resolved the case in a way that made the
ruling in Brown much easier than it otherwise would have been.
Finally, Sweatt had implications beyond the equal protection context: it marked the first time that the Court looked beyond the
form to the substance of education. In this sense, the decision
provided a basis for more exacting judicial scrutiny of the academic environment.
This Article will analyze these aspects of the Sweatt case. Part
I describes the facts leading to the litigation. Part II examines
the Supreme Court precedents facing Sweatt's attorneys, both in
the area of school segregation and in the field of education generally. This section concludes that the Court at best seemed prepared only to enforce the Plessy doctrine, and none too rigorously
at that. Part III focuses upon the process of making the record at
the trial. This section demonstrates how Sweatt's counsel took
advantage of ambiguities in the prior cases to lead the Court to
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 636 n.6 (11th ed. 1985); W. LOCKHART, Y. MMISAR &J.
CHOPER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 1268 n.b (5th ed.
1980). The case is the subject of a textual note in others. See, e.g., J. BARRON & C.
DIENES, CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND PoLICY 510 (2d ed. 1982); P. BREST & S.
LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 406-07 (2d ed. 1983). Still
others do not separately discuss Sweatt at all. See, e.g., E. BARRETT & W. CoHEN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1985); R. ROTUNDA, MODERN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES (2d ed. 1985).

Sweatt has fared somewhat better in the treatises. One leading reference work devotes a detailed paragraph to the case. J. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA &J. YouNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 631 (2d ed. 1983). Professor Tribe, on the other hand, discusses it in a
footnote. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1020 n.6 (1978).
12. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
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address the realities of segregated education. Part IV analyzes
the proceedings in the Supreme Court and the ultimate decision
in the case. This section examines the factors which may have led
the Court to rule as it did, including the record made by Sweatt's
attorneys, the law professors' amicus brief, the cumulative impact
of the companion cases, the position of the Truman administration, and larger societal developments. Finally, part V briefly explores the effects and implications of the Sweatt decision for
related legal issues.

I.

The Road to Court

On February 26, 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt, a black postal
worker with "a yen to become a lawyer," 13 applied for admission
to The University ofTexas School ofLaw. 14 Since the state constitution required racial segregation in education, 15 University
President Theophilus Shickel Painter explained that Sweatt could
not be enrolled. 16 Painter's letter rejecting Sweatt's application
informed him that, as an alternative, the state would provide him
with the opportunity to pursue his studies by creating a
"colored" law school. 17 Sweatt declined this offer. Instead, represented by a team of NAACP attorneys headed by Thurgood
Marshall, 18 he filed suit to compel The University of Texas to admit him.
From the beginning, Heman Sweatt's attempt to break the
13. L. MILLER, supra note 9, at 338. At the time, there were only 23 black lawyers in
Texas, although the state had a black population exceeding 800,000. R. KLUGER, supra
note 7, at 260.
14. Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1948, writ
refd), rev'd, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
15. "Separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children, and impartial provision shall be made for both." TEx. CoNsT. art. 7, § 7 (repealed 1969).
16. For further discussion of Heman Sweatt's background, see infra notes 19-22 and
accompanying text.
Theophilus Shickel Painter was a highly respected cytogeneticist who had first reported the widely accepted-but erroneous-finding that the human cell contained 48
chromosomes. Painter's 1921 research was consistently replicated untill955, when two
Swedish researchers, applying recently developed techniques, discovered that the correct number of chromosomes was 46. D. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS 238-41
(1985).
17. Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall as a Lawyer: The Campaign Against School Segregation,
1946-1950, 40 Mo. L. REv. 411, 427 (1981).
18. Sweatt was initially represented by W J. Durham of Dallas. Durham was a cooperating attorney for the NAACP. He in turn involved the national legal staff of the organization. Marshall was the NAACP's chief counsel.
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color bar at The University of Texas raised questions. There
was, first, the matter of his academic qualifications. In one
sense, those were entirely in order: he had graduated with honors from Wiley College. 19 In another, they were not: that allblack institution was unaccredited. This fact offered the University a convenient nonracial basis for refusing to enroll him. 20
There was also the question ofhis motive for applying. Although
he was a man of "sterling character," 21 some people wondered
"whether [he] earnestly desired to study law." 22
Long before Sweatt applied to the Texas law school, the issue
of higher education for blacks had been a matter of public controversy in the state. While the state constitution authorized the
establishment of "a College or Branch University" for blacks, 23
that provision had not been implemented when Sweatt applied to
The University ofTexas. 24 A year earlier, however, the state legislature had enacted a statute providing for the establishment,
"[w]henever there is any demand for same," of black-only professional programs that were "substantially equivalent to those offered at the University of Texas." 25 Since no black law school
19. Q.jOHNSON, PRICE OF fREEDOM 2 (1954).
20. Tushnet, supra note 17, at 427. The state never cited Wiley College's lack of
accreditation as a basis for denying Sweatt's application. The explanation for this apparent oversight is not entirely clear, but it may be that The University of Texas previously
had accepted white graduates of unaccredited institutions. If so, this reason for rejecting Sweatt would have been exposed rather easily as entirely pretextual. Cf C. TRILLIN, AN EDUCATION IN GEORGIA 38 (1964) (attorneys for highly qualified black applicant
to University of Georgia who had been rejected solely on basis of preadmission interview showed that many white students were interviewed only after they had enrolled).
The president of the University of Oklahoma chose not to rely upon the lack of accreditation of the undergraduate college of the first black applicant to the law school precisely
because the university had accepted white transfer students from unaccredited institutions. G. CROSS, BLACKS IN WHITE COLLEGES 39 (1975).
21. O.joHNSON, supra note 19, at 2, 27.
22. !d. at 2. At trial, the state asked Sweatt numerous questions suggesting that the
NAACP had put him up to refusing to attend any all-black law school and to demanding
admission to The University of Texas. E.g., Record at 174, 176, 177-78, 180, 182-83,
184-86, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Record].
23. TEX. CaNST. art. 7, § 14.
24. See Hornsby, The "Colored Branch University" Issue in Texas-Prelude to Sweatt vs.
Painter, 61]. NEGRO HIST. 51, 55-58 (1976).
25. Act of June 1, 1945, ch. 308, 1945 Tex. Gen. Laws 506 (repealed 194 7). This
statute changed the name of Prairie View State Normal and Industrial College for Negroes to Prairie View University. Section 2, which permitted the creation of black-only
professional curricula at the institution provided:
Whenever there is any demand for same, the Board of Directors of the
Agricultural and Mechanical College, in addition to the courses of study now
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existed at the time, the trial court continued the case for s1x
months to give the state a chance to establish one. 26
In response, the state Board of Regents authorized the creation of a law school for blacks as part of Prairie View University _27
Two black lawyers were hired as part-time instructors for the institution, which consisted of a pair of rented rooms in Houston. 28
When the proceedings resumed, the trial judge held that these
actions satisfied the constitutional mandate of separate but equal
facilities. 29
While Sweatt's appeal was pending, however, the legislature
repealed the earlier statute under which the Prairie View law
school had been authorized. It was replaced by a law creating the
Texas State University for Negroes. 30 This was to be "a university of the first class" 31 that would offer a wide range of courses,
"all of which [were to] be equivalent to those offered at The University of Texas. " 32 The new university was to be located m
authorized for said institution, is authorized to provide for the establishment of
courses in law, medicine, engineering, pharmacy,journalism, or any other generally recognized college course taught at the University of Texas, in said Prairie View University, which courses shall be substantially equivalent to those
offered at the University of Texas.
26. Sweatt v. Painter, No. 74,945 (!26th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., June 26,
1946); 210 S.W.2d at 446.
27. Minute Order No. 203-46, Board of Directors, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, Dec. 4, 1946; 210 S.W.2d at 446.
28. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 261; Tushnet, supra note 17, at 428.
29. Sweatt v. Painter, No. 74,945 (!26th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Dec. 17,
1946); 210 S.W.2d at 446.
30. Act of March 3, 1947, ch. 29, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws 36; 210 S.W.2d at 446-47.
The new university may have been created because the state recognized the frailty
of its legal position. Tushnet, supra note 17, at 428. Prairie View, of which the original
black law school was to be a part, was a weak institution that counted such vocational
courses as mattress-making and broom-making toward the bachelor'~ degree. R.
KLUGER, supra note 7, at 261. Whatever the explanation, Governor Beauford Jester proposed to create Texas State shortly after his inauguration in January 1947. Previous
proposals to establish a full-fledged university for blacks had foundered on a state constitutional prohibition on the use of general revenues for the purpose. This obstacle was
surmounted because the state had accumulated a $120 million surplus that was available
to fund the new institution. See O.JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 7; Hornsby, supra note 24,
at 59.
31. Act of March 3, 1947, supra note 30, § I.
32. !d. § 2. This section provided in relevant part:
The Texas State University for Negroes shall offer all other courses of higher
learning, including, but without limitation, (other than as to those professional
courses designated for The Prairie View Agricultural and Mechanical College),
arts and sciences, literature, law, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, journalism, education, and other professional courses, all of which shall be equivalent to
those offered at The University of Texas. Upon demand being made by any
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Houston, but until it began operations there, a temporary law
school would open in Austin. 33 These developments prompted
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals to vacate the trial court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. 34
II.

The Legal Background

An appreciation of the early procedural maneuvers requires
some understanding of the law of race relations as well as an
overview of the law of education as both had evolved through the
end ofvVorld \Afar II. Although the interest of the national government in education antedates the adoption of the Constitution, 35 the Supreme Court had little occasion to consider the
subject before Sweatt. Most of the cases involving schools and
colleges in fact presented standard questions of the law of contract, 36 the rules of descent, 37 or the extent of state regulatory
powers. 38 The few decisions which focused upon the educational
qualified applicant for any present or future course of instruction offered at
The University of Texas, or its branches, such course shall be established or
added to the curriculum of the appropriate division of the schools hereby established in order that the separate universities for Negroes shall at all times
offer equal educational opportunities and training as that available to other
persons of this state.
33. !d. § 11; 210 S.W.2d at 446-47.
34. Sweatt v. Painter, No. 9619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin, Mar. 26, 1947); 210
S.W.2d at 446.
35. For example, the Northwest Ordinance provided: "Religion, morality, and
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools
and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Ordinance of July 13, 1787,
art. III, 32 J. CoNT. CoNG. 334, 340-41 (R. Hill ed. 1936). For discussion of the background and implementation of this language, see Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
173, 177-79 (1855). Cf Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,443 n.9 (1962) (Douglas,]., concurring) (religion no longer a function of public schools).
36. E.g., Indiana ex. rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) (tenure); Dodge v.
Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1938) (pension rights of teachers); City of New
Orleans v. Fisher, 180 U.S. 185 (1899) (use of tax funds for payment ofjudgment creditor); Bryan v. Board of Educ., 151 U.S. 639 (1894) (interpretation of college charter
provision); Atchison Bd. of Educ. v. DeKay, 148 U.S. 591 (1893) (validity of school
bonds); Doon Township v. Cummins, 142 U.S. 366 (1892) (same); McGahey v. Virginia,
135 U.S. 662 (1890) (same); The Pennsylvania College Cases, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 190
(1871) (interpretation of college charter provision).
37. E.g., Cornell Univ. v. Fiske, 136 U.S. 152 (1890) (validity of bequest); McDonagh's Ex'rs v. Murdoch, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 367 (1853) (will contest).
38. E.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) (pupil vaccination requirement); Waugh
v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589 (1915) (regulation banning fraternities from state
university); Wyoming v. Irvine, 206 U.S. 278 (1907) (control of federal land grant
funds); Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905) (alteration of school district boundaries);
Buchanan v. City of Litchfield, 102 U.S. 278 (1880) (school district bonding limits); Da-
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1rocess suggested that the Justices would apply minimum scruiny unless some favored value were at stake. The Court had
i.ven scant indication that it regarded genuine racial equality as
uch a value.
The Segregation Cases
1. Deference to state policy.-The "separate but equal" doctrine
ad its origin in a transportation suit, but it quickly spread to the
eld of education. 39 In Plessy v. Ferguson, 40 the Court upheld a
ouisiana statute that required segregated railway carriages
gainst a challenge by a black plaintiff. 41 Mter summarily distissing his thirteenth amendment claim, 42 the majority found no
iolation of the fourteenth amendment. 43 Justice Brown emphazed that the Constitution sought to establish political, as oposed to social, equality. 44 Therefore, laws providing for racial
!gregation did not necessarily imply the inferiority of one group
, another. 45 As he explained for the Court:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument
; v. Indiana, 94 U.S. 792 (1876) (apportionment of school funds); Springfield Town·
ip v. Quick, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 56 (1859) (same); Board ofTrustees v. Indiana, 55 U.S.
i How.) 268 (1852) (control of college); see also Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. College,
1 U.S. 636 (1911) (tort liability); infra notes 120-179 and accompanying text.
39. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491 & n.6 (1954). Segregated schools
parently were approved judicially for the first time in a Massachusetts case in which
1arles Sumner represented the unsuccessful black plaintiff. Roberts v. City of Boston,
Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849). The state legislature thereafter prohibited separate
wols. Ch. 256, 1855 Mass. Acts 674. For discussion of the voluminous litigation con·ning the constitutionality and equality of such separate schools in state and lower
leral courts, see D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAw 368-71 (2d ed. 1980);
rson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 470, 482 n.27; Leflar & Davis,
Tegation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARv. L. REv. 377, 430-35 (1954).
40. 163 u.s. 537 (1896).
41. Homer Plessy, the plaintiff, claimed that he was only one-eighth black and that
could pass for white, id. at 541, but did not argue that the state law should not apply
him on that account.
42. !d. at 542-43. The Court found the lack of conflict between the statute and the
rteenth amendment "too clear for argument." !d. at 542.
43. !d. at 552.
44. !d. Perhaps to defuse suggestions that Plessy was a product of peculiarly South' attitudes and experiences, defenders of the decision have taken pains to point out
tjustice Henry Billings Brown, the author of the majority opinion, was born and bred
·ankee. Thus, in Sweatt, the state appellate court observed that Justice Brown was a
ive of Massachusetts who was educated at Yale and Harvard, and who practiced and
ved as a state and federal judge in Michigan before his appointment to the Court.
I S.W.2d at 444 n.2.
45. 163 U.S. at 544.
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to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If
this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it. 46

In support of this proposition, he pointed to "the establishment
of separate schools for white and colored children, which ha[ d]
been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by
courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have
been longest and most earnestly enforced. " 47 The only limitation on the exercise of this power was that of reasonableness, and
Louisiana had not contravened that limitation. 48
The first Justice Harlan, in a celebrated and solitary dissent,
viewed the state's arguments as disingenuous. 49 He pointedly
observed:
Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in
the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from
coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons. . . . The
thing to accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel the latter to keep to
themselves while travelling in railroad passenger coaches. No
one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary. 50

Then, in one of the most famous sentences in Americanjurisprudence, he concluded: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and
46. !d. at 551.
47. !d. at 544. In support of this statement, the Court cited Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Gush.) 198 (1849), but failed to note that the state legislature had enacted a statute soon afterward that effectively overturned that decision. See supra note
39. The Court also noted that Congress had provided for separate schools in the District of Columbia. 163 U.S. at 545.
48. 163 U.S. at 550. This limitation would prevent states from requiring separate
streetcars for persons with hair of a certain color or for aliens or individuals of a particular national origin, and from enacting laws prescribing that blacks and whites walk on
opposite sides of the street or live in houses or operate vehicles of different colors. !d. at
549-50. The plaintiff had argued that none of these regulations would conflict with the
logic of "separate but equal." !d. at 549.
49. !d. at 552-64 (Harlan,]., dissenting). While defenders of segregation emphasize
Justice Brown's Northern background, see supra note 44, most people overlook Justice
Harlan's history as a slaveholder and opponent of federal efforts to protect the rights of
blacks, including the Emancipation Proclamation, the Reconstruction amendments to
the Constitution, and Reconstruction civil rights statutes. See generally Westin,jolzn Mm·slzall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation of a Southeme1·, 66
YALE L.j. 637, 638-54 (1957).
50. 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. " 51
Nevertheless, only three years later he wrote the unanimous
opinion in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 52 a decision which appeared implicitly to approve the operation of segregated schools. In that case, a group of black parents and
taxpayers challenged the closing of the one high school in their
county open to black children while high schools available only
to whites continued to operate. 53 The board argued that it
lacked the funds to provide both primary and secondary schools
for blacks and that it could better fulfill the educational needs of
the black population by training the larger number of elementary
school pupils instead of the smaller group of high schoolers. 54
At oral argument the plaintiffs explicitly challenged the constitutionality of separate schools. The Court, however, refused
to consider that argument because it had not been raised in the
pleadings. 55 Justice Harlan went on to point out that the aggrieved blacks could not benefit from the relief they were seeking, since an injunction would close the white high school rather
than compel the board to maintain a black institution. 5 6 The record contained no evidence that the board of education intentionally discriminated against the black children. 5 7 In the absence of
a "clear and unmistakable disregard" of federally protected
rights, education was exclusively a matter of state concern. 58
Hence, black high school students had no enforceable right to
attend a public school, and black parents could be compelled to
51. !d. at 559.
52. 175 u.s. 528 (1899).
53. !d. at 530-31.
54. !d. at 532-33. The board noted the availability of private schools open to blacks
at no greater cost to them than a public school. !d. at 534-35, 544.
55. !d. at 543.
56. !d. at 544.
57. !d.; cJ. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976) (showing of discriminatory intent or invidious motivation required to establish violation of equal protection
clause).
The Cumming Court noted that "different questions might have arisen" had the
plaintiffs sought to compel the board to operate a black high school and the board refused out of racial bias to do so. 175 U.S. at 545. In fact, the plaintiffs had prayed for
"such other and further relief as [is] equitable andjust," id. at 531, a prayer that might
have supported such an order.
58. !d. at 545. But see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(suggesting racial superiority of whites, at least as to wealth, prestige, achievement, and
power). This latter statement at least raises the possibility that the Court failed to examine alternative forms of relief out of its own racial prejudice.
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pay taxes to support a system from which their children were
excluded.
Less than a decade later, in Berea College v. Kentucky, 59 the
Court upheld a state law which imposed criminal penalties upon
parties who conducted racially mixed classes. 60 Although the
statute applied to individuals and associations as well as corporations, the majority held it severable and found no impropriety
insofar as it affected the college as a state-chartered corporation. 61 Since Kentucky had reserved an explicit right of amendment when it issued the college's charter and the segregation
requirement did not prevent Berea from carrying out its educational purposes, 62 the decision rested upon an adequate state
ground. 63 The Court implied, however, that proceedings against
an individual might raise federal constitutional issues not present
in this suit. 64
Once again, Justice Harlan dissented. On the procedural
side, he maintained that the statute was not severable. It was apparent that the state sought to forbid racially mixed instruction
no matter who conducted the class; restricting the prohibition to
59. 211 u.s. 45 (1908).
60. I d. at 58. For the full text of the statute, see id. at 59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61. Jd. at 54-55.
62. Jd. at 56-57. On the significance of the state's reservation of an explicit right to
amend the charter, see infra note 130 and accompanying text. The state court had found
that the college could teach persons of different races at different times or in different
places. Therefore, the institution still could carry out its mission. 211 U.S. at 57.
63. 211 U.S. at 54, 58.
64. Jd. at 54. However objectionable the result in this case may seem to the contemporary mind, it is sobering to contemplate that the decision could have had much uglier
implications. The opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals rested on the proposition
that blacks were a lower order of species. The state court emphasized the overriding
importance of maintaining "the purity of racial blood" and paid homage to "[t]he natural law which forbids [racial] intermarriage, and that social amalgamation which leads to
a corruption of the races . . . . From social amalgamation it is but a step to illicit intercourse, and but another to intermarriage." Berea College v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky.
209, 225-26, 94 S.W. 623, 628 (1906).
The Supreme Court must have made a conscious decision to avoid this basis for
upholding the state law. These racist arguments were plainly before it. Kentucky Attorney General James Breathitt devoted several pages of his brief urging the Court to take
judicial notice of a series of scientific studies of cranial and genetic differences that purported to support the state's position. Brief for Defendant in Error at 4, 38-42, Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). For contrasting analyses of these arguments,
see A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., 9 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE jUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-21, at 731 n.lQ (1984);
Hovenkamp, Social Science and Desegregation Before Brown, 1985 DuKE LJ. 624, 631-37.
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corporations defied common sense. 65 On the merits, he insisted
that the state could not bar racially mixed instruction. 66 He limited his position to state regulation of private schools, however,
explicitly reserving the question of the legitimacy of segregated
public education. 67
By the time of Gong Lum v. Rice, 68 the validity of school segregation seemed unquestioned. In that case, an American child of
Chinese descent was barred from attending the local white high
school because officials had classified her as colored. 69 Chiefjustice Taft, for a unanimous Court, 70 peremptorily rejected her
equal protection challenge, noting that many cases had permitted
states to operate separate schools without federal intervention.
That those decisions had involved black plaintiffs was immaterial;
Orientals could be classified as nonwhite. 71
There were three bright spots in this otherwise dismal picture. In McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 72 the Court
suggested that a statute authorizing railroads to provide luxury
cars for whites but not for blacks was unconstitutional. By implication, "separate but equal" required at least some form of "separate" provision for blacks; whatever the criterion of equality,
nothing could not be equivalent to something. This observation
was pregnant with significance, for it represented "a challenge to
the entire structure of Jim Crow law built up since the [end of
65. 211 U.S. at 61-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 67-68.
67. Id. at 69.
68. 275 u.s. 78 (1927).
69. Id. at 80, 82.
70. The Court included Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, who are widely
viewed as among the most liberal members to have served up to that time. Stone, of
course, wrote the famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 {1938), the leading text for judicial protection of minority rights. See
Cover, The Origins ofjudicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE LJ. 1287, 128997 (1982). Holmes, however, was notably unsympathetic to racial equality claims. For
example, he joined the majority opinion in Berea College and in a number of decisions
upholding state laws requiring segregation in transportation. He dissented in Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), an important thirteenth amendment case, after having
written the opinion for the Court disposing of the controversy at an earlier stage on
procedural grounds. Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452 (1908). See generally Rogat, Mr.
Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion (pt. 2), 15 STAN. L. REV. 254, 255-75 (1963).
71. 275 U.S. at 85-87. The Chief Justice discussed Cumming, Plessy, and Roberts, and
cited more than a dozen other state and federal cases. !d.
72. 235 u.s. 151 (1914).
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Reconstruction]." 73 In Buchanan v. Warley/ 4 the Court unanimously invalidated a municipal ordinance that prohibited any
person from moving into any house located in any block in which
a m;:Uority of houses were occupied by members of another
race. 75 And in Guinn v. United States / 6 all of the participating Justices joined an opinion striking down under the fifteenth amendment an Oklahoma grandfather clause limiting the franchise to
persons eligible to vote on January 1, 1866, and their lineal descendants, thereby effectively barring blacks from voting. 77
These were mixed blessings, however. The Court upheld the
statute at issue in McCabe because the plaintiffs lacked standing to
sue. 78 The opi.nion in Buchanan seemed more concerned that the
ordinance interfered with private property rights than that it promoted racial segregation with a vengeance. 79 And the rejection
of the grandfather clause in Guinn did not prevent the use of poll
taxes, literacy tests, white primaries, and other devices that effectively prevented blacks, for decades to come, from voting. 80
Moreover, nothing in these decisions questioned the continued
vitality of Plessy. 81 Thus, segregation for all practical purposes
appeared immune from constitutional attack.
73. A. BICKEL & B. ScHMIDT, JR., supra note 64, at 783.
74. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
75. !d. at 70, 82.
76. 238 U.S. 347 (1915). Ironically, the proposition that this device discriminated
against blacks was argued by Solicitor General john W. Davis, who would close his career before the Supreme Court nearly 40 years later as the chief advocate for school
segregation in Brown.
77. On the same day that Guinn was decided, the Court struck down a similar grandfather clause that defined the right to vote in municipal elections in Annapolis, Maryland. Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 382-83 (1915).
78. 235 U.S. at 163-64.
79. This is the conventional reading of the decision. For a suggestion that Buchanan
might be read, at least in part, as upholding the civil rights of blacks as well as traditional
property rights, see A. BicKEL & B. ScHMIDT, JR., supra note 64, at 813-17.
80. Oklahoma managed to blunt the impact of Guinn by quickly passing a new statute giving those persons who had been disenfranchised by the grandfather clause only
twelve days to register to vote or be forever barred. This provision ultimately was invalidated in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 270, 277 (1939).
81. Indeed, the Court in McCabe appeared to reaffirm Plessy. The appearance may
have been deceiving, however. Justice Hughes' only reference to that precedent came in
a sentence observing that "there is no reason to doubt the correctness" of the conclusion of the lower court that "separate but equal" comported with the fourteenth amendment. 235 U.S. at 160.
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2. Enforcing "separate but equal. "-Careful examination of the
segregation precedents suggested two possible challenges to the
"separate but equal" doctrine. First, in practice, "separate" was
never "equal." No state-supported black college offered any
form of graduate or professional training. 82 Even worse, a 1929
study by the NAACP revealed that segregated public school districts typically spent up to ten times as much on a white child's
education as they did on a black child's instruction. 83 Thus, a
series of suits designed to force equality of the separate educational institutions might be pressed. If they succeeded, substantial improvements in black education would result. Indeed, the
cost of equalizing black schools might persuade many jurisdictions to abandon segregation altogether.
Second, a close reading of the precedents suggested that the
Supreme Court never had squarely upheld the constitutionality
of segregation in education. 84 In Curnrning, the plaintiffs had
made a fatal procedural error. They pressed the constitutional
issue for the first time at oral argument in the Supreme Court.
For that reason, the Court refused to address this fundamental
question. 85 Nor had Gong Lurn involved a challenge to the validity
of racial classifications in education. The student in that case
claimed that, as justice Harlan had observed in Plessy, segregation
laws were designed to isolate blacks from the rest of the population. Since whites sought to insulate themselves from the harms
alleged to flow from contact with blacks, Chinese-Americans
were entitled to the same protection. Thus, she conceded the
validity of racial classifications; she merely contested the legality
82. Except for Howard University and Meharry Medical College, neither of which
was state-operated, no black college had any kind of graduate or professional program
for blacks. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 136.
83. A subsequent analysis prepared for the NAACP pointed out:
The study financed by the American Fund for Public Service made by the
N.A.A.C.P. revealed that in South Carolina more than ten times as much was
expended for the education of white children as for Negro children; that in
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi and Alabama, more than five times as much; in
North Carolina, Virginia, Texas, Oklahoma and Maryland, more than twice as
much.
N. Margold, Preliminary Report to the joint Committee Supervising the ExpendituTe of the 1930
Appropnation by the Amencan Fund for Public Service to the NAACP, repnnted in part in J.
GREENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON jUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 50 (1977).
84. See id. at 50-57 (reprinting excerpts of Margold Report); see also R. KLUGER, supra
note 7, at 133-37.
85. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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of the administrative determination that she was not "white" for
purposes of school attendance. 86
Accordingly, the NAACP determined to contest the constitutionality of segregation one step at a time. The ultimate goal was
to have Plessy overruled, but the organization realized that it
could not achieve that result all at once. Therefore, it began by
taking that case literally: if segregation were the law, then the
separate facilities must be truly equal. The campaign began at
the graduate and professional level, where the absence of such
programs in the segregating states held out the prospect of relatively easy victories. At the outset, the question of what might
constitute victory seemed less important than simply improving
educational opportunities. And, it turned out, all of the leading
litigation in this phase involved law schools, perhaps because of
the importance of attorneys to the movement for racial
equality. 87
The first breakthrough came in Maryland, where the state
courts ordered Donald Murray admitted to the state's only law
school. 88 The plaintiff, an alumnus of Amherst College, was
barred from the law school at the University of Maryland solely
on racial grounds. 89 Instead of allowing blacks to attend the university, Maryland provided scholarships for them to pursue their
legal studies outside the state. 90 The Maryland Court of Appeals
concluded that this system failed to provide substantial equality
86. The following passage captures the essence of the student's argument:
If there is danger in the association [with blacks], it is a danger from which
one race is entitled to protection just the same as another. The White race may
not legally expose the Yellow race to a danger that the dominant race recognizes and, by the same laws, guards itself against.
Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 10, Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). For the full
argument, see id. at 8-19.
87. See Houston, The Need for Negro Lawyers, 4 J. NEGRO EDuc. 49 (1935). Charles
Hamilton Houston was the first legal director of the NAACP and later became dean of
the law school at Howard University. His students at Howard included Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood Robinson, Robert Carter, and several others who litigated the most
significant segregation cases before and after Brown. See R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at
125-31, 147-56, 159-66, 179-80, 186-205. See generally G. McNEIL, GROUNDWORK:
CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983). Marshall, of
course, now serves as Associate justice of the Supreme Court; Robinson is chiefjudge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; Carter is a member of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
88. Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 489, 182 A. 590, 594 (1936).
89. !d. at 480, 182 A. at 590.
90. !d. at 485-86, 182 A. at 593.
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since there was no assurance that any particular applicant, regardless of qualifications, would receive a scholarship, the aid did
not cover additional housing, travel, or incidental expenses, and
the plaintiff could not study Maryland law although he planned to
practice in the state. 91 Because there was no present possibility
of establishing a separate law school for blacks inside the state,
only the admission of Murray to the white school could vindicate
his personal right to equal treatment. 92
Murray was admitted to the University of Maryland and completed the regular course of study without academic or social difficulty. At commencement, he was handed his diploma by
Governor Herbert O'Connor, who had signed the state's pleadings as attorney general during Murray's litigation with the university. He was hired for his first position as a lawyer by the
assistant attorney general who had argued the case against his
admission to the law school. 93
The first of these suits to reach the Supreme Court was Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 94 in which Lloyd Lionel Gaines challenged his race-based exclusion from the University of Missouri
law school. 95 Gaines was an especially attractive plaintiff. He had
an excellent scholastic record at Lincoln University, an all-black
institution operated by Missouri. Thus, the state could not argue
that he lacked the requisite qualifications for admission to the
white law school without admitting that Lincoln was not equal to
as well as separate from the University of Missouri. 96 The state
courts denied relief because Missouri had agreed to establish a
law school for blacks in the future and meanwhile provided scholarships for them to attend law schools of comparable quality in
adjacent states. 97 Chief Justice Hughes, relying heavily upon the
reasoning of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Murray and his
own dicta in 1\1/cCabe, held that Gaines had the same personal
right to a legal education within Missouri as did whites. 98 The
91. /d. at 486-87, 182 A. at 593.
92. /d. at 487-89, 182 A. at 594.
93. Record at 290-91.
94. 305 U.S. 337 (1938), rev'g 342 Mo. 121, 113 S.W.2d 783 (1937).
95. 305 U.S. at 342.
96. See Kelleher, The Case of Lloyd Gaines: The Demise of the Separate But Equal Doctrine,
56]. NEGRo HrsT. 262, 263-64 (1971).
97. 342 Mo. at 132-34, 138-39, 113 S.W.2d at 788, 790-91.
98. 305 U.S. at 351.
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Court explained:
The basic consideration is not as to what sort of opportunities
other States provide, or whether they are as good as those in
Missouri, but as to what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes
to white students and denies to negroes [sic] solely upon the
ground of color. The admissibility of laws separating the races
in the enjoyment of privileges afforded by the State rests wholly
upon the equality of the privileges which the laws give to the
separated groups within the State. 99

In the absence of a black law school, the state would have to enroll him in the otherwise all-white university. 100
Justice McReynolds, in a dissentjoined by Justice Butler, suggested that the Gaines decision would permit the state to "abandon her law school and thereby disadvantage her white citizens
without improving petitioner's opportunities for legal instruction; or she may break down the settled practice concerning separate schools and thereby, as indicated by experience, damnify
both races." 101 He added that Missouri "has offered to provide
the negro [sic] petitioner opportunity for the study of law-if
perchance that is the thing really desired." 102
In response to the Supreme Court's ruling, Missouri established a law school for blacks at Lincoln University. Gaines failed
to appear at the trial at which the equality of the two schools was
to be assessed and was never seen again. 103 During the pendency
99. !d. at 349.
I 00. !d. at 352.
101. 305 U.S. at 353 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S.
217 (1971) (permitting city to close municipal swimming pools rather than desegregate
them); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (allowing closing of whites-only city park on
grounds that land had reverted by operation of state law to heirs of grantor following
invalidation of racial restriction in will devising land to city).
102. 305 U.S. at 353 (McReynolds,]., dissenting). The palpable implication was that
Gaines was more interested in gaining sexual access to white women than in obtaining a
law degree. In this regard, Justice McReynolds was reflecting the same social attitudes
that were explicit in the Kentucky Court of Appeals opinion in Berea College and which
traditionally have animated much racist ideology. See G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 349-55 (abridged ed. !958); B. BETTELHEIM & M. JANOWITZ, SOCIAL CHANGE AND
PREJUDICE 150-51, 247-48, 287-88 (1964); T. GossETT, RACE: THE HisTORY oF AN IDEA
IN AMERICA 270-73 (1965); C. HERNTON, SEX AND RACISM IN AMERICA (1966); T. PETTIGREW, A PROFILE OF THE NEGRO AMERICAN 139-40 (1964); C. STEMBAR, SEXUAL RACISM
4-36 (1976).
103. See Bluford, The Lloyd Gaines Story, 32 J. EDUC. Soc. 242, 245 (1959); Kelleher,
supra note 96, at 267-68.
There is an interesting side note to this story that involves Lucille Bluford herself.
She served as executive editor of the Kansas City Call. She received her college degree
with the aid of one of Missouri's out-of-state scholarships for blacks, then applied to the
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of his suit, Gaines obtained an M.A. in economics from the University of Michigan and worked in that state for a time before
returning to St. Louis. 104 All of the rumors and theories sur105
rounding his disappearance remain unverified to this day.
While Gaines has been characterized as an "enormous milestone,"106 its significance was far from clear after Sipuel v. Board of
108
Regents. 107 The case was virtually on all fours with Gaines.
Ada
Sipuel, the plaintiff, was an honor graduate of Langston University, an Oklahoma state college for blacks that offered no graduate or professional training of any kind. 109 She was excluded
from the University of Oklahoma law school due to her race. In a
per curiam opinion issued only four days after oral argument, the
Court ordered Oklahoma to provide her with a legal education
"in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of
any other group." 110
The state responded by converting a section of its capitol
building to serve as the Langston law school. 111 Sipuel attempted to challenge this response by filing an original action for
mandamus in the Supreme Court. The Court concluded that its
earlier decision had not addressed the issue of the constitutional
adequacy of separate educational institutions. Accordingly, it
could not now consider the method of compliance with the original order. 112
The Sipuel case had a happier outcome than did Gaines. Mter
University of Missouri journalism school. Upon her exclusion from the school on racial
grounds, she filed suit, raising the same basic issues as had Gaines. Bluford v. Canada,
32 F. Supp. 707 (W.D. Mo. 1940), appeal dismissed, 119 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1941). The
state thereupon opened a journalism school at Lincoln, a school that she refused to
attend. See Kelleher, supra note 96, at 269-70.
104. Kelleher, supra note 96, at 268.
105. See Clayton, The Strange Disappearance of Lloyd cm:nes, EBONY, May 1951, at 26, 27.
106. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 213.
107. 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam), rev'g 199 Okla. 586, 190 P.2d 437 (per
curiam), motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied sub nom. Fisher v. Hurst,
333 u.s. 147 (1948).
108. See 332 U.S. at 632.
109. See G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 65; Hubbell, The Desegregation of the University of
Oklahoma, 1946-1950, 57 J. NEGRO HrsT. 370, 371 (1972).
110. 332 U.S. at 633. The Court cited only Gaines in its brief order.
Ill. See G. CROSS, supra note 20, at 52-54; R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 259; Hubbell,
supra note 109, at 374.
112. Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147, 150 (1948) (per curiam). This procedural disposition of the matter promptedjustices Murphy and Rutledge to file dissents. !d. at 151.
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refusing to enroll in the makeshift black law school, 113 the plaintiff ultimately was admitted to the previously all-white University
of Oklahoma law school in June 1949. Except for internal stateimposed segregation similar to that which ultimately was invalidated in one of the companion cases to Sweatt, 114 she apparently
encountered no unusual difficulties. 115 She received her degree
in 1951 and practiced law with an Oklahoma City firm before returning to Langston as an administrator in 1956. Subsequently,
she joined the faculty there and chaired the social sciences department for many years. 116
Ultimately, the Langston law school went out of existence on
June 30, 1949, having enrolled just one student. 117 By contrast,
the black law school established in response to Gaines lasted four
years and produced several members of the bar. 118 But the
message of the Supreme Court was profoundly ambivalent: it
seemed that blacks had no enforceable right to attend all-white
public universities if the state provided any sort of alternative
education.
As Sweatt began making its way through the Texas courts,
"separate but equal" appeared to be the law of the land. Segregation was not yet equated with discrimination. Only if a state
failed to provide a separate facility within its own borders would
the judiciary interfere. Even then, however, there probably
113. Following the Supreme Court's refusal in Fisher v. Hurst to order the desegregation of the University of Oklahoma, her lawyers filed suit in state court claiming that the
"overnight" Langston law school was not equal to the white school. At trial, Professor
Henry H. Foster of the University of Oklahoma, a native of the state, called the overnight school "a fake, fraud, and deception." G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 81-82; Hubbell,
supra note 109, at 374. More restrained criticisms of the inadequacies of Langston came
from Professors Walter Gellhorn of Columbia, Max Radin of the University of California, and Charles Bunn of the University ofWisconsin and from Deans Erwin Griswold of
Harvard and Earl G. Harrison of the University of Pennsylvania. The state court, ruling
the social and economic effects of segregation irrelevant, refused to admit testimony by
Robert C. Weaver, Dean Charles Thompson of the Howard University graduate school,
and Robert Redfield, chairman of the anthropology department at the University of Chicago. G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 83; Hubbell, supra note I 09, at 374 n.22.
114. See infra notes 231-235 and accompanying text.
115. See Report of the First Negro Student to Enter the Law School, University of
Oklahoma, Brief for the Texas Council of Negro Organizations as Amicus Curiae, App.
D, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Texas Council Amicus
Brief]; G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 113-14, 116-17.
116. G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 134.
117. /d. at 114; Hubbell, supra note 109, at 378.
118. See Kelleher, supra note 96, at 270.
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would not be a very rigorous analysis of the equality of the segregated institutions. 119 This result followed from the judicial conception of education as a matter primarily of state and local
concern, a conception reflected in the Court's resolution of other
educational issues over the previous century and a half.
B.

Other Education Decisions

I. The Early Cases.-Not until 1906, in Speer v. Colbert, 120 did a
true educational issue reach the Supreme Court. Even then, the
principal question was the validity of a bequest to Georgetown
University to support research in colonial history. 121 After disposing of various procedural and interpretive issues, 122 Justice
Peckham rejected the challenger's argument that the school's
charter did not authorize the university to accept the gift. He
reasoned that Georgetown was empowered to instruct its students in the liberal arts and sciences and that " '[t]he cultivation
of historical research would seem to be a part of a liberal
education.' " 123
More typical of the early cases was the first, and perhaps the
most celebrated, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 124
Chief Justice Marshall began by observing that "education is an
object of national concern and a proper subject oflegislation," 125
and the underlying controversy involved important questions re119. There were, however, some cases suggesting increased judicial sensitivity to racial discrimination. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (barring judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in the District of Columbia); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (barring state judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (holding unconstitutional a state
law prohibiting Japanese aliens from owning land); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944) (holding white primaries conducted by political party unconstitutional); see also
supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
120. 200 u.s. 130 (1906).
121. !d. at 133-34.
122. The bequest was not void for misnomer (the testator had devised to Georgetown University, while the school had been incorporated as Georgetown College)
since the bequest clearly was intended for this particular institution. ld. at 141-43. The
gift also included a provision for a medical scholarship. The Court rejected a claim that
its terms were too indefinite to enforce, pointing to the conditions contained in the will.
ld. at 146-47. Neither was the bequest void for conflict with a statute barring such gifts
to sectarian institutions since Georgetown was open to students of all faiths and did not
aim to propagate any particular religious creed. !d. at 143-44.
123. ld. at 145 (quoting 24 App. D.C. 187, 204 (1904)).
124. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
125. ld. at 634.
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specting political and religious control over higher education. 126
Nevertheless, the litigation concerned the meaning of the contract clause of the Constitution. 127 The trustees challenged a set
of amendments to the college charter which substantially increased the power of the State of New Hampshire over the institution's affairs. 128 The Court determined that the charter was a
contract which the state had impaired by its amendments. 129 The
most important legal proposition in the decision, however, may
have been the suggestion made explicitly by Justice Story and implicitly by Chief Justice Marshall that states could reserve the
power to amend corporate charters. 130
Similarly, in Head v. University of Missouri, 131 a mathematics
r.rnf'<>cc£"\r rhaJJpngPrl
st<>tlltP th<>t rl1srhargPrl thP PiltlTP llnlVPTp.l
sity faculty in the middle of his term of appointment and set up a
new board of curators. The new board promptly hired a new
mathematician. 132 The Court viewed the matter as a simple contract question. The professor had accepted the position "subject
to law." Thus, his employment was terminable at the will of the
legislature. 133 Moreover, Head could hardly claim to have been
surprised by the faculty purge. He had been hired as a replacement after a prior statute had dismissed all of the incumbent instructional staff. 134 Nowhere did the Court express the slightest
interest in the consequences of the instability of the faculty for
the university or for its students. 135
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126. See generally Campbell, Dm·tmouth College as a Civil Liberties Case: The Fonnation of
Constitutional Policy, 70 KY. LJ. 643, 666-95 (1982).
127. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
128. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 626.
129. !d. at 651-53.
130. !d. at 708, 712 (Story,]., concurring); see also id. at 638 (opinion of the Court); cJ.
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1908) (explicit right of amendment reserved in charter permits state to prohibit instruction of racially mixed groups).
131. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 526 (1873).
132. The plaintiff had been selected for a six-year term. Slightly over three years
later the legislature took the action which gave rise to this suit. !d. at 530.
133. !d. at 530-31.
134. !d. at 531.
135. It is not at all clear that Head would come out differently today. As the Court
explained in a seminal modern due process case involving the dismissal of an untenured
professor at a state university, a public employee is entitled to a pretermination hearing
only if the employment implicates a liberty or property interest. A liberty interest arises
if the government publishes information about a discharged employee that might jeopardize that person's good name or reputation. A property interest is "a legitimate claim
of entitlement" arising from "an independent source such as state law" rather than from
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Therefore, the significance of Speer should not be exaggerated. While it contained the first discussion of educational philosophy that was not dictum, the Court applied minimum
scrutiny to the practice at issue. In this sense, the decision followed the traditional notion of education as a state and local matter. The NAACP attorneys in Sweatt, then, could not rely upon
the case as a predicate for forcing close judicial inquiry into the
quality of segregated law schools.

2. Freedom of contract and substantive due process. -Some dicta
by Justice Holmes a year later implied that upon a sufficiently
strong showing, a plaintiff might overturn a state educational
policy on constitutional grounds. 136 The hint was equivocal at
best, however, 137 and was quickly forgotten in the era of substantive due process. 138 Indeed, that theory provided the basis for
the Constitution. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 577 (1972). That legitimate claim of entitlement may arise from "mutually explicit understandings" even in the
absence of a controlling state statute. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
It is unlikely that Head could have prevailed on any procedural due process claim.
Unless the curators published potentially derogatory information about him, he could
not assert the deprivation of a liberty interest. The mere fact of discharge from public
employment does not call into question an individual's good name or reputation.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1976). And while recent cases make clear that
procedural protections for property interests are a matter of federal law, Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1492-93 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422,432 (1982); Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480,491 (1981), Head could not
demonstrate any basis in state law for asserting a property interest that would trigger
those protections.
Head could not have overturned his dismissal on substantive grounds unless he
could show that it was based upon an impermissible reason. There is no indication,
however, that he had been fired in retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights or
for any other prohibited reason. Cf Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival
of Substantive Due Process, 1975 SuP. CT. REv. 261, 282 n.ll2 (despite losing on procedural due process claim, Professor Roth was ultimately awarded compensatory and punitive damages of $6,746 on grounds that he had been terminated for reasons that
violated the first amendment).
136. Interstate Consol. St. Rv. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 86-88 (1907). In this
case, the transit company challe~ged a statute requiring that it transport school children
at half price. After finding that the regulation had taken effect before the company began operations and rejecting the challenge on this ground, id. at 84-85, Holmes noted
the public importance of education and the latitude that the states enjoyed under the
police power to promote it. !d. at 87-88.
137. Id at 87 (suggesting that the fourteenth amendment must allow states "a certain
latitude in the minor adjustments of life, even though by their action the burdens of a
part of the community are somewhat increased").
138. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. I (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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the first decisions holding state education regulations invalid,
and Justice Holmes dissented from them.
In N!eyer v. Nebraska 139 and Bartels v. Iowa, 140 teachers of German challenged state laws prohibiting instruction in foreign languages. 141 Justice McReynolds found an obvious interference
with the rights of the teachers to teach, of pupils to learn, and of
parents to control the education of their children, an interference
not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. 142
Although the opinion contains stirring language emphasizing the
importance of education, 143 the case turned on two narrow
points of law. First, the statutes interfered with freedom of contract. 144 Second, at least two of the legislative regulations were
arbitrary in that they appiied only to the teaching of certain foreign languages. 145
139. 262 u.s. 390 (1923).
140. 262 u.s. 404 (1923).
141. Meyer involved a Nebraska statute which prohibited the teaching of any language
other than English to any pupil who had not completed the eighth grade. Meyer, 262
U.S. at 397. Bartels concerned three state laws. One was the same statute that gave rise
to the Meyer case. Bartels, 262 U.S. at 411. The others were from Iowa and Ohio. The
Iowa law barred instruction in any language other than English in secular subjects, except that schools could teach foreign languages to students who had gone beyond eighth
grade. Ohio simply forbade instruction in German of pupils below eighth grade. !d. at
409-10.
In !11eyer, an Evangelical Lutheran parochial school teacher was convicted of using a
collection of biblical stories in German while teaching a 10-year-old. 262 U.S. at 396-97.
The consolidated cases in Bartels involved similar facts. In the first, an Iowa parochial
school teacher was convicted of teaching his pupils to read German. In the second, two
Ohio parochial school teachers likewise were convicted of teaching the German language to primary school pupils. In the third, the Nebraska District of the Missouri
Synod of the Lutheran Church sought to enjoin state and local officials from enforcing
Nebraska's language law against church schools. See Bartels, 262 U.S. at 409-11.
142. Me}el·, 262 U.S. at 401, 402-03. Bartels was decided the same day and on the
authority of Meyer. 262 U.S. at 409.
143. Justice McReynolds observed that "[t]he American people have always regarded
education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should
be diligently promoted." Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400. He illustrated this point by quoting
from the Northwest Ordinance. !d. He then went on to quote from Plato on the public
importance of education. !d. at 401-02.
144. On freedom of contract, Justice McReynolds wrote:
Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as
harmful. Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation.
His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct
their children, we think, are within the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.
!d. at 400.
145. The Ohio statute applied only to the teaching of German. See supra note 141.
The Nebraska courts had construed their statute as applying only to modern languages.
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Two years later, the Court struck down an Oregon law requiring that all children between the ages of eight and sixteen attend
public schools. Applying his !Vfeyer rationale in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 146 Justice McReynolds found the statute "arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful." 147 Once again, he recognized the social
significance of education, noting that the case did not present
any issue as to the power of the state to require school attendance or to establish minimum qualifications for teachers or curricular coverage. 148 As in Meyer, he went on to underscore the
right of parents to control the upbringing of their children. 149
The states lacked power "to standardize [their] children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." 150
While this statement might be taken as an endorsement of the
value of educational diversity and the benefits of competition in
the academic sphere, it more likely reflects the Court's general
hostility to government regulation of social and economic matters. This interpretation is supported by the Court's emphasis
upon the threatened destruction of the business and property of
the operators of private and parochial schools. 151
Thus, these decisions suggested that in a proper case the
Court would scrutinize educational policies with some care.
They could not provide Sweatt with grounds for much optimism,
however. For one thing, the substantive due process-freedom of
contract mode of jurisprudence, upon which they rested, had
fallen into disrepute. 152 For another, the author of these opinMeyer, 262 U.S. at 400-01. Justice Holmes dissented in both cases, noting that a state
reas_onably might decide to require instruction only in English for primary students in
the t~terest of promoting the use of a common tongue. Bartels, 262 U.S. at 412 (Holmes,
J., dtssenting). Nevertheless, he concurred in the result in the Ohio case because he
viewed the special provision for German as impermissible. Id. at 4l3.
146. 268 u.s. 510 (1925).
147. Id. at 536. ·
148. ld. at 534.
149. ld. at 534-35.
150. Id. at 535.
15 1. . The plaintiffs were a religious order and a private corporation which operated
parochtal and military schools. Id. at 531-33. Beyond their business and property inter~sts, they were permitted to assert the rights of parents and pupils affected by the state
aw. ld. at 535-36; cf. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (enjoining enforcelent of territorial law imposing detailed regulations upon private schools conducted in
dapanese and other foreign languages on grounds that implementation probably would
e;~roy the schools, resulting in a deprivation of property without due process of law).
p ~2 · See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. lOO (1940); United States v. Carolene
ro s. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937);
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ions had written an icy dissent in Gaines suggesting that the type
of racial classification at issue in Sweatt posed no constitutional
problems, 153 and the ultimate outcome in Sipuel seemed to confirm that view.
3. The religion clauses.-At the same time, a parallel line of
cases implied the development of increasing judicial sensitivity to
the relationship of religion to education. Not surprisingly, the
Court began cautiously, refusing to disturb federal payments for
sectarian Indian schools 154 and state provision of textbooks to
parochial as well as public school pupils. 155
The decision in Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California 156 contained a more searching analysis, but the result was the
same. Several college freshmen were suspended after they refused to enroll in a required ROTC course because of their religious beliefs. 157 The Court rejected each of their arguments.
First, the university regulation did not violate the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment since the privilege of attending the institution came from the state, not a federal entity . 158 Second, the students had no due process right to
exemption from military training. 159 Third, the ROTC requireNLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Then-Professor Frankfurter, while applauding the spirit of toleration promoted by
the result in Pierce, criticized the substantive due process rationale underlying it as a cost
"on the whole . . . greater than its gains.". Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?, 43
NEW REPUB. 85, 86 (1925), reprinted in F. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND PoLITICS 195, 197
(1939); see also A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 25 (1970).
153. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
154. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
155. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. ofEduc., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
156. 293 u.s. 245 (1934).
157. The plaintiffs were sons of clergymen whose churches had petitioned to have
their members exempted from all military training as conscientious objectors. At the
start of the fall term, the students unsuccessfully sought to be excused from the ROTC
requirement. They then refused to take the course and were suspended pursuant to a
board of regents regulation. !d. at 250-56. The students offered to take any alternative
course which the university proposed, but that offer was refused. !d. at 254.
158. !d. at 261. In fact, the University of California had accepted benefits under the
Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-05,307-08 (1982)).
This in turn obligated the institution to offer some form of military training. The state,
however, retained control of the details of that training. Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 258-59.
159. The Court found that conscientious objectors had no constitutional protection
from military service or training, although Congress might provide exemptions by
means of legislation. Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 264. On the other hand, citizens owed the
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ment did not conflict with the Kellogg-Briand Pact, under which
the United States had renounced war as an instrument of national policy. 160
More significantly, Hamilton rejected an argument that would
be central in Sweatt: that the students had a unique interest in
attending a particular institution. They claimed that the University of California had denied them the opportunity for higher education of a quality that was not available elsewhere except at
prohibitive cost. 161 The majority dismissed this position as "un. tenable." 162 Justice Cardozo's concurrence suggested that the
ROTC requirement might be "unwise or illiberal or unfair" as
applied to conscientious objectors, but that alone did not raise a
constitutional issue. 163 Thus, if a state effectively could exclude
students from a university on the basis of their most fundamental
religious beliefs, at least where those students might attend a less
prestigious state college, perhaps a state also could exclude students from one law school on the basis of their race where the
state provided a less prestigious alternative within its own borders. The situations differ, of course, because race is immutable,
whereas religious beliefs may not be. Moreover, the equality of
any alternative institution was not at issue in Hamilton, whereas
that was the fundamental question in Sweatt. Nevertheless, such a
conclusion followed from the logic of Gaines and Sipuel.
Certain post-Hamilton developments, however, implied that
the Court was becoming increasingly sensitive to the integrity of
the educational process. In particular, West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette 164 held a compulsory flag salute regulation
unconstitutional as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses. 165 Justice
Jackson found the "delicate" responsibility of school officials to
gove_rnment, which had the responsibility to maintain peace and order, the duty of defendmg it against all enemies. ld. at 262.
160. ld. at 265.
161. Id. at 254.
162. ld. at 262.
163. ld. at 266 (Cardozo, J., joined by Brandeis & Stone, JJ., concurring). Justice
C_ardozo pointed out that military instruction did not constitute an establishment of religl_on, and absent a pledge of subsequent military service there could be no interference
With free exercise. Moreover, conscientious objectors historically had been recognized
~s. an act of grace, but often with conditions more onerous than those at issue in this
ltlgation. !d. at 266-67.
164. 319 u.s. 624 (1943).
165. Id. at 642.
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"educat[e] the young for citizenship . . . reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes."166 This conclusion required the overruling of !V!inersville
School District v. Gobitis, 167 a precedent of only three years' standing. Justice Frankfurter, who dissented vigorously in Barnette, 168
had expressed similar concerns in Gobitis but felt that the Court
should abjure judicial resolution of the competing policy questions lest it become "the school board of the country." 169
While the flag salute cases involved special dispensation for
religious believers, two others decided while Sweatt was making
its way through the state courts dealt with affirmative assistance
to church-related schools. In Everson v. Board of Education, 170 a
closely divided Court upheld a system of partial reimbursement
of the transportation costs of public and parochial school students.171 Noting the inherent tension between the establishment
and free exercise clauses of the first amendment, the majority
reasoned that the program served a public purpose and was neutral as between believers and nonbelievers. 172 The four dissenters, on the basis of their interpretation of the record, rejected
both of these conclusions. 173
The following year, in Illinois ex rel. !V!cCollum v. Board of Education, 174 the Court had much less difficulty in finding released-time
religious training unconstitutional. The program at issue permitted sectarian instructors to offer students, while in school buildings during school hours, up to forty-five minutes of weekly
instruction in the tenets of their faith. 175 Justice Black, who had
166. Id. at 637.
167. 310 u.s. 586 (1940).
168. 319 U.S. at 646.
169. 310 U.S. at 598. To this Justice Jackson replied, "The Fourteenth Amendment
. . . protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted." 319 U.S. at 637.
170. 330U.S.1 (1947).
171. Id. at 3.
172. Id. at 7, 16-18.
173. !d. at 19-22 Qackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 50-52 (Rutledge, J., joined by Frankfurter, Jackson & Burton, lJ ., dissenting).
174. 333 u.s. 203 (1948).
175. The program offered sectarian instruction to students in grades four through
nine provided that their parents consented in writing. The teachers were members of
the clergy and active lay congregants. !d. at 207-09.
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written the prevailing opinion in Everson, saw this as direct aid to
religion which the establishment clause prohibited. 176 While the
difficulty of reconciling the two cases prompted several other
opinions, only one Justice dissentedP 7
Despite the inconsistency of these decisions, which upheld the
challenged practices as often as not, they reflected an underlying
trend away from complete judicial deference to the views of edu. cators. In each of these cases, the plaintiffs' arguments received
serious consideration. Their claims were sometimes rejected,
but only because either the particular facts did not bring the
plaintiffs within the rule for which they were contending 178 or
compelling policy concerns made relief inappropriate. 179 This
trend suggested that the Court might reexamine the Plessy doctrine as applied to education. At the least, the refusal to review
Oklahoma's compliance with Sipuel because that question had not
been presented properly virtually compelled the conclusion that
the Justices would clarify the meaning of equality. For that to
happen, however, a litigant would have to make the necessary
record.
III.

Making the Record

Establishing either the unconstitutionality of segregation or
the inequality of the two institutions in Sweatt would prove difficult. Texas not only had announced its intention to open a separate law school for blacks, as Missouri had in Gaines,l 80 but had
proceeded in apparent good faith to create a full-fledged "university of the first class" in response to the plaintifFs application
176. !d. at 210, 212. This decision does not undermine the argument that Sweatt
marked the first time that the Court looked to the substance rather than the form of
education. McCollum explicitly turns on the direct aid to religion. Thus, the Court focused on the form of the program, even though some members addressed substantive
aspects of the matter. See 333 U.S. at 212 (opinion of Frankfurter, J., joined by Jackson,
Rutledge & Burton, JJ.) .
. _177. In addition to Justice Frankfurter's opinion, in which all oftheEverson dissenters
Jomed, Justice Jackson concurred. Only Justice Reed dissented.
178. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 6, 16-17; Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 261-65.
179. See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 598-99.
180. Texas initially authorized the establishment of a law school at Prairie View University "[w]henever there is any demand for same . . . . " Act of June 1, 1945, ch. 308,
§ 2, 1945 Tex. Gen. Laws 506 (repealed 1947). Similarly, the curators of Lincoln University had the right, "whenever necessary and practicable in their opinion," to establish
an~ course of instruction. Mo. REv. STAT. § 9618 (1929) (repealed 1965), quoted in
Games, 305 U.S. at 346 n.2.
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to the white institution, as Oklahoma had not in Sipuel. 181 The
board of directors of Texas State recruited faculty members vigorously and determined to obtain accreditation for the new law
school as quickly as possible. 182 Thus, a victory in this litigation
would have very broad implications. A defeat, on the other hand,
would force the NAACP to litigate a potentially endless series of
suits designed to equalize racially separate educational programs.
Whether Sweatt sought a ruling that the Plessy doctrine had no
place in the field of public education 183 or simply that Texas had
not provided him with a satisfactory alternative forum for legal
training, the result hinged on the definition of equality. The
courts would have to compare The University of Texas law
school with that of the new Texas State University for Negroes to
determine whether they were identical, substantially equal, or
substantially unequal. Even such seemingly objective factors as
student-faculty ratio, class size, and library holdings might rationally be evaluated differently. To the extent that subjective
criteria such as prestige and tradition entered the equation, the
outcome became even less predictable. The lack of judicial expertise in educational administration, the difficulty of continuous
monitoring of substantial equivalence, and the limits on equitable powers to compel specific performance suggested the magnitude of the plaintiff's burden. 184
An additional complication arose from the legislation establishing the new university, which authorized an interim law
school in Austin pending the selection of a permanent site for the
181. There was no Oklahoma Jaw school for blacks when Sipuel filed suit. See supra
note 109 and accompanying text. Texas had authorized a black law school and in fact
offered Sweatt a place in such an institution. See supra notes 17 & 27-33 and accompanying text.
182. In its decision, the Supreme Court noted that the school was "on the road to full
accreditation." 339 U.S. at 633; 0. joHNSON, supra note 19, at 14-15, 49-50, 103-05,
108-09. Ozie Johnson, the first full-time dean of the Texas State Jaw school, suggested
that the establishment of the new university benefited black professors in general. The
mere existence of a new institution committed to substantial equality with one of the
nation's leading research universities stimulated increases in black faculty salaries
throughout the South. !d. at 14-15.
183. See Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954).
184. See Leflar & Davis, supra note 39, at 393-96. For discussion of the range of factors which were litigated under the "separate but equal" doctrine, see D. BELL, supm
note 39, at 368-71; Larson, supra note 39, at 482 n.27; Leflar & Davis, supra note 39, at
403-04, 430-35.
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entire institution. 185 At the time of the state court hearing on the
equality of the separate facilities, only the temporary black law
school had begun operations. 186 The interim Texas State school,
located in an office building across the street from the state capitol, was of course unaccredited. Its faculty consisted of three junior professors from The University of Texas, all of whom
maintained their offices and teaching responsibilities on the
white campus. The dean, registrar, and librarian of the white
school served in the same capacities at the black school. Except
for a handful of books on hand and about 10,000 volumes on
order, Texas State had no library; its students were to have access to the Texas Supreme Court library on the second floor of
the capitol. 187 The school opened with an enrollment of two, not
including Heman Marion Sweatt, who refused to attend. 188 By
contrast, Texas had a nationally distinguished law school. It had
a faculty of sixteen full- and three part-time professors, a library
of 65,000 volumes, a law review, moot court, other extracurricular activities, and a large corps of prominent alumni to serve its
850 students. 189
The trial on the question of the equality of the two law
schools presented an unusual public debate on educational philosophy between prominent legal academics. Thurgood Marshall, chief counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and head
of the team of attorneys representing Sweatt, relied upon Earl G.
Harrison, dean of the University of Pennsylvania law school, and
Malcolm P. Sharp, professor of law at the University of Chicago.190 Texas Attorney General Price Daniel, who personally
tried the case for the state, depended upon the testimony of
185. ActofMarch3, 1947,supranote30, § 11.
186. 210 S.W.2d at 446. By the time of the appeal to the Supreme Court, the permanent Texas State law school had opened in Houston. 339 U.S. at 633.
187. 339 U.S. at 633; 210 S.W.2d at 448-50.
188. 210 S.W.2d at 446; 0. joHNSON, supra note l9, at 13. The permanent Texas
State law school had five full-time professors, 23 students, a 16,500-volume library with
a full-time staff, a moot court, and legal aid facilities by the time of the Supreme Court
decision. 339 U.S. at 633. In addition, its first alumnus had become a member of the
Texas bar. Id.
189. 339 U.S. at 632-33.
190. This was not the only time during this period that Marshall had brought in acade~ic experts to testify against segregation. In Sipuel his witnesses included Dean Erwin
Gnswold of Harvard and Professors Max Radin of the University of California, Walter
Gellhorn of Columbia, and Charles Bunn of the University of Wisconsin, in addition to
Dean Harrison and Professors Redfield and Thompson. See G. CRoss, supra note 20, at
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Dean Charles T. McCormick and Professor A.W. Walker, Jr., of
The University of Texas.
The most basic contrast between the two schools concerned
physical arrangements. The University ofTexas law school occupied an entire building that had been designed for the purpose,
whereas the Texas State law school was located on the bottom
floor of an office building. 191 The white school had three classrooms to serve its 850 students, while the black school had two
classrooms to serve its projected enrollment of ten. Moreover,
the Texas law school building was severely overcrowded, accommodating approximately twice as many students as originally
planned. 192 Thus, according to Dean McCormick, Texas State
had "at least equal and probably superior facilities for the study
oflaw." 193 He conceded, however, that he meant equal in quality
rather than equal in size. 194
Similarly, Dean McCormick admitted that Texas State students would have to use the Supreme Court library across the
street from the school until the arrival of the books that had been
ordered. Of course, The University of Texas library had a larger
collection, and one assembled for use by students and scholars
rather than by practitioners and judges. Still, the two facilities
were at least arguably equal in that the court library offered more
space per student than the "exceedingly crowded" university
library. 195
Other aspects of the two schools were identical. For example,
both followed the same curriculum and imposed the same admis80-81, 83; R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 258; Hubbell, supra note 109, at 374 & n.22; see also
supra note 113.
191. The precise characterization of the floor which the interim Texas State law
school occupied was a source of controversy throughout the proceedings. At trial,
Sweatt's lawyers consistently referred to it as the basement. See, e.g., Record at 88-89,
350. Dean McCormick described it as the first floor, but he conceded that it was four or
five steps below the level of the sidewalk. Record at 88. In the Supreme Court,
Thurgood Marshall referred to Texas State as a "basement law school." 18 U.S.L.W.
3280 (1950) (summary of oral argument); Brief for Petitioner at 71.
192. Record at 76-79 (testimony of Dean McCormick).
193. Record at 109.
194. Record at 110.
195. Record at 79. Dean McCormick also recognized that the 10,000 volumes destined for the Texas State library would not fit on the single floor of the building in which
the black school was located. He pointed out, however, that the institution had an option to take over all of the remaining space as needed. Record at 89.
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sion requirements. 196 In addition, the instructors in the first-semester courses at Texas State were teaching the same courses
simultaneously at Texas. 197 Thus, all applicants would be equally
qualified; once enrolled, students would at least in theory learn
common subjects from a common faculty.
In short, there were some obvious differences in physical resources and facilities between Texas and Texas State. If that
were the crux of the dispute, however, the Sweatt case would have
been a lot simpler. Whatever the physical differences between
the two law schools, it was not at all clear that they were unequal
in a legal sense. Precisely because the argument based upon
physical disparities was ambiguous, Marshall devoted most of his
case to establishing the existence of more subtle qualitative differences between the two schools. Most of this aspect of the trial
focused upon the effects of the much smaller class size at Texas
State.
Even these intangible factors lent themselves to conflicting interpretations, however. Dean McCormick and Professor Walker,
for example, emphasized that small classes presented unusual
opportunities for personal instruction. 198 Thus, "[i]n a class of
ten, all of the students are on their toes all the time, because they
realize they are apt to be called upon next." 199 Marshall's experts noted that Sweatt had been the only black law school applicant when Texas State was created and condemned the
minuscule class size projected for Texas State. Dean Harrison
said that it would be "mistaken, even absurd, to speak of any institution that has one student as a law school. " 200 Professor
Sharp emphasized that even if ten students enrolled, the new
school could not offer an education equal to that provided at
Texas.2ot
These professors concentrated on what they regarded as the
most important shortcomings of Texas State. First, racially restrictive enrollment policies would deny its students the benefits
196. Record at 81-82, 84.
197. Record at 84, 113. All three professors were in their first year of law teaching.
Record at 93.
198. Record at 117 (testimony of Dean McCormick); Record at 305-06,314 (testimony of Professor Walker).
199. Record at 306 (testimony of Professor Walker).
200. Record at 216-17.
201. Record at 343.
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of interchange and association with a community that reflected
the diverse viewpoints and experiences of the general populace.202 Second, the extremely small size of the class would prevent effective instruction in the case method 203 and the
maintenance of a law review, moot court, full-time faculty, and
other indicia of an outstanding law school. 204 Third, the complete absence of upperclassmen during Sweatt's first year would
deny him important educational benefits, a loss that would defeat
his personal right to legal training equal to that provided at The
University of Texas. 205 By whatever criteria, then, the two
schools were not equal.
The trial also featured a clash of views on segregated education. On this issue, Marshall called Robert Redfield, a lawyer and
chairman of the anthropology department at the University of
Chicago. For its part, the state called Benjamin F. Pittenger, who
recently had retired as dean of education at The University of
Texas. Professor Redfield emphasized that segregation interfered with the learning process in several ways. First, compelled
separation prevented students from meeting and learning about
members of the groups from which they were isolated. Second,
segregation engendered racial suspicion and distrust. Education
for all would be enhanced in an environment that was broadly
representative of the total community. 206 He recognized that
202. Record at 197, 200, 226-27 (testimony of Dean Harrison); Record at 341-42,
348-53 (testimony of Professor Sharp).
203. Record at 216-18,225-26 (testimony of Dean Harrison); Record at 342-43 (testimony of Professor Sharp).
204. Record at 220-23 (testimony of Dean Harrison); Record at 355-57 (testimony of
Professor Sharp).
Dean McCormick testified that the absence of these programs from Texas State was
not significant at the time of trial because none was open to first-year students. Record
at 104-07, 112. Indeed, he characterized these activities as "minor and extraneous."
Record at 106. Professor Walker agreed with respect to the absence of a law review.
Record at 316. Dean McCormick suggested, however, that a law review might be established as part of "the natural evolution of a well-conducted law school." Record at 107.
Both Dean Harrison and Professor Sharp emphasized that the existence of a law
review helped to create incentives for academic excellence for all students. Record at
221 (testimony of Dean Harrison); Record at 347 (testimony of Professor Sharp). Indeed, Professor Sharp maintained that the law review is "[o]ne of the most important"
elements of legal education because its existence "sets the tone" of the entire institution. Record at 34 7.
205. Record at 219 (testimony of Dean Harrison); Record at 34 7 (testimony of Professor Sharp).
206. Record at 194-95, 197.
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some forms of segregation could not be eliminated immediately.
Nevertheless, laws requiring segregation could "be changed
quickly." 207 In particular, "in every community there is some
segregation that can be changed at once, and the area of higher
education is the most favorable for making the change. " 208
Dean Pittenger, on the other hand, contended that blacks
could receive a substantially equal education in separate colleges
and universities. He based his conclusion, in large measure,
upon the view that blacks would have a better overall experience
in a segregated institution; they would find more opportunities to
participate in extracurricular activities and to develop leadership
skills. 209 Underlying his position, however, was a concern for the
effects of desegregation upon public schools more generally. He
could not see how segregation, once breached at the university
level, could be maintained in the elementary and secondary
grades. If these classes were integrated, Dean Pittenger feared
for the future of white support for the public schools:
I think it is reasonable to believe that at the present time the
attitude of Texas people being what it is to a very considerable
degree, that the effect of the abandonment of segregation on
the lower level would set back the public school movement in
this state, and as one who has devoted his life to an attempt to
improve it, I can't regard that with equanimity. 210
He also thought it unlikely that whites would accept the assignment of the many black teachers who staffed segregated schools
to mixed classrooms. This would deprive many black professionals of their livelihood. Moreover, since many black college graduates pursued teaching careers, desegregation ultimately might
discourage younger blacks from seeking higher education for
fear that they would be unemployable. 211
207. Record at 198.
208. Record at 199.
209. Record at 323-25.
210. Record at 327. Dean Pittenger further explained
that it would become . . . a bonanza to the private white schools of the State,
and that it would mean the migration out of the schools and the turning away
from the public schools of the influence and support of a large number of children and of the parents of those children . . . .
Now, the south has had to fight against the private school tradition since
the beginning. . . . [T]he fight for public education in this State has been to a
very large extent the matter of the converting of people with that background
to the support of public schools, and to the patronage of public schools.
Record at 326.
211. Record at 326-27.
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To buttress his arguments against segregated schooling, Marshall also tendered testimony from Charles H. Thompson, dean
of the graduate school at Howard University and editor of the
Journal of Negro Education, concerning disparities between black
and white colleges in Texas and from Donald G. Murray, the successful plaintiff in the University of Maryland case that had preceded Gaines, 212 concerning his experience as the first black
student at that institution. 213 The trial court permitted both witnesses to testify in order to afford a complete record on appeal
but ultimately refused to consider their evidence in reaching its
decision. 214
The significance of Marshall's trial strategy cannot be exaggerated. By focusing upon the benefits of integrated education
and upon the suspicion and intolerance engendered by segregation, he sought for the first time to move the legal debate away
from preoccupation with the purely physical differences in the
separate facilities provided for whites and blacks. Perhaps he did
so out of concern that the purely physical differences between the
two schools were not great enough to constitute inequality under
the Plessy doctrine. In a larger sense, however, this novel approach harkened back to the point of Justice Harlan's dissent in
that case: whites had imposed segregation because they regarded blacks as subhuman beings who were unfit to participate
in civilized society. The equality of the separate facilities was entirely irrelevant to this overriding precept, the truth of which
Harlan said no one would be so wanting in candor as to deny.
Yet for half a century American society had denied it.
The Texas courts were no different. The trial court focused
upon the state's moral and financial commitment to an entirely
new institution offering "substantially equal facilities" and having identical entrance, curricular, and graduation requirements,
as well as the same faculty and courses as those provided at The
University of Texas. Accordingly, Sweatt "would be afforded
212. Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936). For discussion of this case,
see supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
213. Record at 228-86 (testimony of Dean Thompson); Record at 287-91 (testimony
of Murray).
214. The court considered Dean Thompson's testimony only as it compared the
Texas State program with that of The University of Texas. The judge rejected his evidence concerning other institutions in the state. The court ruled Murray's testimony
inadmissible in its entirety. 210 S.W.2d at 446.
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equal if not better opportunities for the study of law in [the] separate school" at Texas State. 215 Thus, he had suffered no cognizable injury as a result of his exclusion from the white university.
Nevertheless, the record had been made.
This record did not impress the Court of Civil Appeals, which
affirmed the judgment. That court first refused to consider the
constitutional validity of "separate but equal" education on the
basis of an "unbroken line" of United States Supreme Court decisions upholding segregation. 216 Any claim that separate
schools were inherently discriminatory, at least at the graduate
and professional level, was "predicated upon a purely abstract
and theoretical hypothesis, wholly unrelated to reality." 217 Since
this case dealt with the world with all its imperfections rather
than some hypothetical ideal state, the trial court had correctly
applied the test of "substantial" rather than "absolute" equality.
The testimony of Professor Redfield and the other experts on the
harmful effects of separate schools likewise addressed the wisdom rather than the constitutionality of the state's policy of segregation.218 The evidence demonstrated "an enormous outlay
both in funds and in carefully and conscientiously planned and
executed endeavor, in a sincere and bona fide effort to afford
every reasonable and adequate facility and opportunity" to
Sweatt for the study of law in a separate but equal public
institution. 219
When the Texas Supreme Court denied review, 220 the case
was on its way to the Supreme Court of the United States. This
time, Marshall made certain that the Justices would reach the
merits. He presented only one question for review: "May the
State of Texas Consistently With the Requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment Refuse to Admit [Sweatt] Because of Race
and Color to the University of Texas School of Law?" 221
215. Sweatt v. Painter, No. 74,945 (126th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., June 17,
1947) (unpublished), Record at 440.
216. 210 S.W.2d at 444 & n.l.
217. !d. at 445.
218. /d.
219. /d. at 44 7.
220. Sweatt v. Painter, No. A-1695 (Tex. Sept. 29, 1948).
221. Petition for Certiorari at 13.
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The Supreme Court Proceedings
The !Vfaking of a Trilogy

The petition for certiorari was filed on March 23, 1949. 22 2
The Court took no immediate action on the petition and held it
over to the term beginning in October. 223 Review was ultimately
granted on November 7. 224 As if to underscore its significance,
the Court scheduled Sweatt for consideration simultaneously with
two other important civil rights cases, Henderson v. United States 225
and JvfcLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education. 226
Both cases involved the physical isolation of blacks who were admitted to facilities open to whites. While these cases appear easy
in retrospect, in both instances the lower courts had upheld
segregation.
In Henderson, a black government employee was denied dining
car service by the Southern Railway while traveling on official
business. 227 A railroad rule required segregated seating in the
dining car. Under the regulation, most of the tables were reserved exclusively for whites; two were conditionally set aside for
blacks. Those tables were available to white passengers if all of
the remaining tables were occupied. When those tables were oc222. I7 U.S.L.W. 3290 (1949).
223. See I7 U.S.L.W. 3379 (U.S. June 27, I949) (order carrying over all unresolved
matters). It is not clear whether the Court delayed action on the petition out of reluctance to address potentially explosive issues or due to Jack of time. See Hutchinson,
Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmalling in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 CEo. L.J. I,
I5 (1979).
224. 338 u.s. 865 (1949).
225. 339 U.S. 8I6 (1950). The Court wasted no time in setting this case for plenary
consideration. The jurisdictional statement was filed on February I7, I949. 17
U.S.L.W. 3276 (1949). The Court noted probable jurisdiction on March I4. 69 S. Ct.
740 (1949).
226. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). The Court delayed action on this case even longer than it
did in Sweatt. The jurisdictional statement was filed on March I, I949, I7 U.S.L.W. 3290
(1949), but the noting of probable jurisdiction did not occur until November 7. 70 S.
Ct. 139 (1949). The Court's lack of haste apparently arose from concern that the case
may have become moot due to McLaurin's uncertain academic status at the end of his
first semester at the University of Oklahoma. This issue was resolved when counsel assured the Court that McLaurin was continuing his studies in good standing. See Hutchinson, supra note 223, at 15 n.I12.
227. The incident in question occurred in May 1942. Elmer Henderson was a field
representative of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices. He made
his trip to investigate alleged incidents of discrimination in Alabama. Brief for the
United States at 4, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 ( 1950) [hereinafter cited as
Henderson Brief].
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cupied by blacks, a curtain was drawn to separate them from the
white tables. Henderson went to the dining car three times in an
unsuccessful effort to obtain a meal, but each time whites were
sitting at the black tables. 228 Henderson filed a complaint with
the Interstate Commerce Commission claiming that he had been
subjected to "undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage" in violation of section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce
Act. 229 The Commission rejected the complaint, and a divided
three-judge court affirmed that ruling. 230
The McLaurin case arose in the wake of Sipuel. George
McLaurin, a senior professor at Langston University who wanted
to obtain a doctorate, 231 was one of half a dozen other blacks who
228. !d. at 3; Henderson, 339 U.S. at 818-20.
229. Ch. 104, § 3, 24 Stat. 379, 380 (1887) (renumbered § 3(1) by Transportation
Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 405, 41 Stat. 456, 479) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1074l(b)(d) (1982)).
230. Henderson, 339 U.S. at 820. The actual procedural history of the case is somewhat more complex than the account provided in the text. This complexity accounts for
the eight-year interval between the railroad's refusal to serve Henderson and the
Supreme Court decision. The Commission initially held that Henderson's treatment
had violated the statute but attributed the incident to the bad judgment of an employee.
Henderson v. Southern Ry., 258 I.C.C. 413, 419 (1944). A three-judge court set aside
that ruling because the railroad's policy of reserving some tables exclusively for whites
and others only conditionally for blacks resulted in unequal treatment of the races. The
court remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. Henderson v.
United States, 63 F. Supp. 906, 916 (D. Md. 1945) (three-judge court). Meanwhile, the
railroad had changed its policy to reserve one table exclusively for blacks. When occupied, however, that table was to be separated from the rest of the dining car by a drawn
curtain; the railroad planned ultimately to install a five-foot partition to set off the black
table. The Commission upheld this new policy. Henderson v. Southern Ry., 269 I.C.C.
73 (l 94 7). The three-judge court, over a dissent by Judge Morris Soper, affirmed. Henderson v. ICC, SO F. Supp. 32 (D. Md. 1948) (three-judge court). The majority reasoned
that the new policy satisfied the requirements of "separate but equal" because, based
upon the racial composition of the railroad's passenger traffic, proportionately fair arrangements had been made for blacks and whites. !d. at 39. Judge Soper dismissed this
point as irrelevant because the right to equal treatment applied to individuals rather
than groups. Nothing in the new policy would assure Henderson of fair treatment in the
same situation that gave rise to his complaint. !d. at 40, 42.
231. G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 65. McLaurin's precise age at the time is unclear.
tv.Iarshall said he was 68. R. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 266. The president of the UniverSity of Oklahoma reports that he was 54. G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 85. However old
he was, it was no accident that McLaurin rather than Ada Sipuel was selected to continue
the challenge to segregated higher education in Oklahoma. Perhaps mindful of Justice
Mc~eynolds' dissent in Gaines, see supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text, Marshall
beheved that no one could plausibly claim that a man of McLaurin's age would be interested in intermarriage. R. KLUGER, supm note 7, at 266.
M Ent.irely apart from that issue, there was a certain symmetry to the selection of
cLaunn as the plaintiff. In 1923, his wife had been the first black to apply to the
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applied to the graduate school of the University of Oklahoma
early in 1948. 232 A study committee established by the regents of
the university recommended that blacks be admitted to graduate
and professional programs in white institutions. 233 The committee explained that creating new curricula for blacks in separate
institutions could not be justified due to prohibitive cost and
small projected demand. 234 Soon afterward, the legislature
amended the segregation statutes to permit blacks to enroll in
white colleges and universities to pursue programs not offered in
black institutions. All instruction offered under this new law,
however, was to be provided on a segregated basis. Pursuant to
the statute, McLaurin was admitted but segregated within the
university. At first he was required to sit in an anteroom adjoining his classrooms, at a designated desk in the library, and at a
particular table in the cafeteria. Thereafter, he was assigned to a
seat in a row of classroom desks set aside for nonwhites and to a
desk on the main floor of the library. A three-judge district court
rejected McLaurin's claim that these arrangements denied him
equal protection. 235
B.

The Arguments

By the time Sweatt v. Painter reached the Supreme Court, its
import had become apparent. The State of Texas filed a 118page brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari, while its
brief on the merits ran 235 pages; both of these documents conUniversity of Oklahoma. Not surprisingly, she was rejected on racial grounds due to the
state's segregation laws. Unfortunately, this was long before anyone seriously considered challenging such policies in court. G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 133.
232. G. CRoss, supra note 20, at 65-66.
233. Jd. at 71-72, 75-77, 86-87.
234. Hubbell, supra note 109, at 375-76.
235. McLaU?in, 339 U.S. at 639-40. The lower court, relying upon Plessy, held that it
lacked authority to "obliterate social or racial distinctions which the State has traditionally recognized as a basis for classification for purposes of education" and that it had a
duty "to honor the public policy of the State in matters relating to its internal social
affairs." McLaurin was partaking of the same facilities as all other students at the University of Oklahoma. The conditions to which he had been subjected "rest[ ed] upon a
reasonable basis, having [their] foundation in the public policy of the State, and d[o] not
therefore deprive [him] of the equal protection of the laws." Therefore, the court concluded in language reminiscent of Plessy, "we cannot find any justifiable legal basis for
the mental discomfiture which the plaintiff says deprives him of equal educational facilities here." McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 87 F. Supp. 528,
530-31 (W.D. Okla. 1949) (three-judge court) (per curiam).
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tained extensive appendices detailing federal and state judicial
decisions upholding segregation and reprinting excerpts from
reports questioning the wisdom of departing from the established pattern of race relations that had grown up in reliance
upon Plessy. Eleven other states submitted an amicus curiae brief
in support ofTexas' position. 236 Six amicus briefs opposing segregation were also filed. In addition to the Solicitor General's
memorandum on behalf of the United States, the most notable of
these came from an ad hoc group known as the Committee of
Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education. 237
1. The NAACP Argument for Sweatt.-Marshall made three
principal points in his brief for Sweatt. First, applying traditional
constitutional doctrine, he maintained that segregation lacked
any rational purpose and hence was invalid. Because "there is no
rational connection between racial differences and any valid legislative objective which a state may attempt to promote in providing public education," Marshall contended, "identical treatment
of the races is mandatory." 238 The importance of education for
the creation of an informed and responsible citizenry had
prompted every state to take over from the private sector the
principal burden of providing schools. 239 There was no basis for
)elieving that the races differed in their intrinsic ability to
earn. 240 Since education for democracy was designed to elimi1ate arbitrary distinctions and segregation imposed just such disinctions, segregation was incompatible with the basic concept of
mblic schooling. 241 These considerations applied with even
rreater force to state-supported law schools. 242
Not content to rest upon these philosophical considerations,
236. See Brief of the States of Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Misssippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, Amici Cuae [hereinafter cited as States Amicus Brief].
237. Other amicus briefs in support of Sweatt came from the American Federation of
'ea_chers, the American Veterans Committee, the American jewish Congress and other
!Wish organizations, and the Texas Council of Negro Organizations.
238. Brief for Petitioner at 12.
239. !d. at 13.
240. !d. at 24.
241. ld. at 15, 19-21.
242. Id. at 16-19. The brief further argued that segregation cannot be justified as a
ean_s for preventing breaches of the peace. Even if protecting public order were a
ffi~Ient justification, however, the experience of other Southern and border statesd Indeed of The University of Texas School of Medicine-which had admitted blacks
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Marshall went on to point out that segregation damaged society
at large. He suggested that segregation promoted interracial isolation, mistrust, and misunderstanding and inflicted a "badge of
inferiority" upon the minority group. Education under these
conditions would have a particularly serious impact upon a black
lawyer, severely limiting the special contributions that he otherwise could make both to his clients and to the community as a
whole. Since segregation offered society no benefits in return
for the serious harms it imposed, the practice could not be
justified. 243
Second, he launched a careful but somewhat oblique attack
on Plessy. He began by distinguishing the decision as dealing
only with transportation, a field in which equality of separate facilities is' much more readily assessed than in education, which
implicates "psychological, sociological, and spiritual factors in
addition to pure physical measurements." 244 He then argued
that the difference in the procedural posture of the two casesPlessy had come up for review of a judgment sustaining a demurrer, whereas this one followed a full trial at which the equality
issue had been fully litigated-afforded yet another reason for
closer scrutiny of Sweatt's claim. 245
Marshall concluded this portion of his brief with two substantive jibes at Plessy. No subsequent decision of the Court had
to formerly all-white universities had shown the fear of violence and discord to be illusory. !d. at 22-23.
The Texas experience involved a black medical student named Herman Barnett.
The all-white University of Texas agreed contractually to provide graduate instruction
to black Texas State University students when TSU could not provide such training.
The Texas faculty taught the blacks outside the white campus, and the students earned
Texas State credits. An exception was made for Barnett because the exorbitant cost of
separate off-campus instruction made that alternative financially unfeasible. Instead,
Barnett was permitted to study at the Galveston branch of The University of Texas. No
problems of any kind resulted from this arrangement. See Report of the First Negro
Student to Enter the Medical School, Texas Council Amicus Brief, supm note 115, App.
C; 0. JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 87.
243. Brief for Petitioner at 26-31.
Only after arguing that segregation could not survive even the traditional rationality
review in this case did Marshall invoke more recent decisions applying more exacting
scrutiny to racial classifications. Since the state had failed to demonstrate a compelling
interest to justify its race-based refusal to admit Sweatt to The University of Texas, it
had denied him the equal protection of the laws. !d. at 31-35.
244. !d. at 44. The brief does not explain what "spiritual factors" might be relevant
to a determination of the equality of two educational institutions.
245. !d. at 45-46.
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squarely upheld the extension of "separate but equal" to education, so "that case is not applicable to this problem. " 246 Only at
this point, and as a last resort, did Marshall urge the Court to
overrule Plessy. He based this argument on a rather perfunctory
review of the background of the fourteenth amendment. 247 More
significantly, he presented statistics showing that whatever might
be said for segregation in theory, as a factual matter, it had utterly failed to afford anything remotely approaching equal educational facilities for blacks. This suggested that "equality, within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, can never be realized under a system of segregation. " 248
Finally, even if "separate but equal" were the appropriate
legal standard, Texas had not provided and never could provide
equality under segregation. The history and pattern of public expenditures for higher education in Texas showed that unlawful
discrimination was inevitable so long as the state required that
blacks and whites study apart from each other. 249 Most important, the two law schools were plainly not equal. Aside from
Texas State's lack of accreditation, there was no comparison between the physical plant of the two institutions. 250 In addition,
the black school, for all practical purposes, possessed no independent library, had absolutely no full-time faculty, and lacked
the number of students required to staff a law review, moot
court, and other facilities "which are essential to achieving the
objectives of a modern law school. " 251 Further, racial restrictions
on enrollment would deprive black law students of the benefits of
"mutual interchange of ideas and attitudes." 252
2. The Law Professors' Amicus Brief-The Committee of Law
Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education originated at
Yale Law School, where Thomas I. Emerson and John P. Frank
_246. !d. at 51. Earlier, the brief distinguished Cumming (which was miscited as "Cummzngs"), Berea College, Gong Lum, Gaines, and Sipuel as cases in which the validity of segregation was either conceded or not litigated. !d. at 4 7-51.
247. Id. at 54-61.
248. !d. at 65.
249. ld. at 67-71. This portion of the brief relied heavily upon an analysis prepared
for the trial by Dean Charles H. Thompson of Howard University. The trial judge, however, refused to consider this evidence in making his ruling. See supm note 214.
250. Brief for Petitioner at 71.
251. Id. at 73.
252. Id. at 74.
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were members of the faculty. Both were friends of Thurgood
Marshall; Frank previously had worked with him on other litigation.253 A group of seven distinguished professors from six leading law schools drafted the brief; ultimately 188 signed it. 254
Their argument was simple: "[S]egregated legal education . . .
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. " 255
The main points in the professors' brief did not differ materially from those which Sweatt's counsel presented, but their emphases contrasted sharply. Where Marshall finessed, the Law
Teachers made a frontal attack on Plessy as the centerpiece of
their argument. They first contended that Congress proposed
the fourteenth au1endment and passed numerous pieces of civil
rights legislation during Reconstruction in order to outlaw all
forms of segregation and discrimimition against blacks. 256 Next,
they claimed that the conceptual underpinnings of Plessy-that
legislation could not overcome the innate differences and hostility between the races and that any attempt to do so would only
exacerbate social conflict-had been disproven by intervening
events. 257 Referring to the government's brief in Henderson, they
observed that segregation had caused serious harm to blacks, demoralized whites, and generally aggravated "the grave maladjustments inherent in the system." 258 Moreover, their own analysis
253. SeeR. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 275. Frank had met Marshall while he was teaching at Indiana University. Marshall went there to discuss a potential suit challenging
discrimination in restaurants near the campus and other matters. The litigation was
never filed because direct action by students and faculty led to the elimination of the
objectionable practices. See Frank, Can the Cow·ts Emse the Color Line?, 2 BuFF. L. REV. 28,
43 (1952).
254. Besides Emerson and Frank, the authors of the Brief of the Committee of Law
Teachers Against Segreg-ation in Legal Education as Amicus Curiae, Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Law Teachers Brief], included Alexander H.
Frey of the University of Pennsylvania, Dean Erwin N. Griswold of Harvard Law School,
Robert Hale of Columbia University, Dean Harold Havighurst of Northwestern University, and Edward H. Levi of the University of Chicago. The brief was reprinted a month
before oral arguments in the l'v!innesota Law Review. See Segregation and the Equal Protection
Clause: Brieffor the Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education, 34 MINN.
L. REV. 289 (1950).
Only four of the signers came from the South, a fact which prompted one of the
authors of the brief to characterize the endeavor as "a cheap virtue." Frank, supra note
253, at 31.
255. Law Teachers Brief, supra note 254, at 2, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 290.
256. !d. at 4-22, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 291-307.
257. !d. at 23-24, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 307.
258. !d. at 31, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 314.
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of the effects of official policies relating to voting, education,
housing, the military services, and employment confirmed that
"elimination of patterns of segregation is not only feasible but is
rapidly going forward under government sponsorship." 259 Thus,
Plessy was neither good law nor sound logic and should be
rejected.
Further, even if the "separate but equal" doctrine were consistent with the fourteenth amendment, that doctrine did not apply and should not be extended to education. This argument
paralleled the position that Marshall had taken in his brief for
Sweatt, 260 although the law professors added some nuances of
their own. The Plessy Court, they observed, carefully stated that
segregation must be reasonable. 261 The decision in Buchanan v.
Warley, 262 which struck down a residential segregation ordinance,
suggested that the validity of mandatory racial separation must
be evaluated in each context. No prior education case had
squarely addressed the issue. Thus, "if segregation in education
is constitutional, it became so under a rule of law that came from
no place." 263
Applying the criterion announced in Plessy itself, the professors contended that segregation in education was unreasonable
and hence unlawful. Not only did segregation impose grave
harm upon its victims, but monitoring separate schools to assure
the requisite equality was a quixotic exercise. 264 Moreover, segregated schools were inherently destructive of democratic values
because they prevented students from getting to know and work
with persons of other backgrounds and experiences. 265 Therefore, with the question squarely presented, the Court should refuse to extend the Plessy doctrine to public education.
Finally, they maintained that, even if Plessy had correctly applied the fourteenth amendment and even if segregation in education were reasonable at least in some circumstances, the two
Texas law schools were inherently unequal. Thus, blacks never
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

ld. at 29, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 312.
See supra text accompanying note 244; compare Brief for Petitioner at 42-51.
163 U.S. at 550; see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
245 U.S. 60 (1917); see supra notes 74-75 & 79 and accompanying text.
Law Teachers Brief, supra note 254, at 35, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 317.
ld. at 35, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 317-18.
ld. at 36-38, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 318-20.
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could obtain the absolute educational parity to which they were
entitled so long as the state obliged them to submit to segregate<
legal training. In short, they invoked the Plessy doctrine itself t<
argue that true equality in legal education was impossible in ra
cially separate law schools. 266
Relying upon points made at trial by Dean Harrison and Pro
fessor Sharp, the Law Teachers emphasized that the all-blacl
Texas State law school was distinctly inferior to the all-white Uni
versity of Texas law school on what they called purely mechanica
factors, such as physical plant. But they insisted that the inequal
ities were even more pronounced due to "factors peculiar tc
legal education." 267 Their brief examined each of these factor:
in turn.
First, a small faculty cannot specialize and necessarily offer:
less diversity of viewpoints to students, even if each individua
student may have greater access to each instructor. The pro
jected four-person faculty at Texas State was inadequate in abso
lute terms to provide a first-class education and was vastl;
inferior to the twenty-eight-member instructional staff a
Texas. 268
Second, small law schools lack important inducements, in
eluding library and other resources, that might permit thei1
faculty to develop national reputations and attract truly outstand
ing teachers and scholars from other institutions. The Texa:
faculty had many nationally prominent members, but it was "be
yond belief that Texas [State could] at any time in the predictable
future acquire the services of their equal. " 269
Third, small schools with small faculties necessarily must af
ford a narrower variety of courses than larger ones. Based upor
the listings in the catalogues of the two institutions, Texas wa:
offering approximately twice as many courses as Texas State. 27 <
Fourth, the limited library holdings at Texas State in contras
to those at The University of Texas would significantly restric
266. !d. at 39, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 320-21.
267. !d. at 40, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 322.
268. !d. at 41, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 322.
269. !d. at 42, rep1inted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 323. In any event, the professors added
Texas State certainly could not attract similarly renowned professors before Sweat
graduated.
270. !d. at 42 & n.IOO, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 323 & n.lOO.
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the quality of research and instruction available to students. It
would cost approximately $100,000 to equalize the basic collection of the two law schools, but there was no indication that the
state was prepared to spend anywhere near that amount of
money for the Texas State library. 271
Fifth, the prestige of the institution and the prominence of its
alumni significantly affect placement opportunities for its current
students. Texas State, as a new school with no graduates and no
reputation in the community when Sweatt sought to begin his
legal studies, simply could not provide him with anything remotely similar to those available to him at "the old, established
school. " 272
Sixth, very small schools cannot support a law review and its
attendant intellectual and professional benefits. The law review
at The University of Texas was "excellent," but there was no
prospect for a similar journal at the much smaller Texas State law
school "for lack of a sufficient number of topnotch students to
man it. " 273
Seventh, a satisfactory moot court program requires a large
enough enrollment to stimulate effective competition among students. The white school had such a pool of students upon which
to draw for "satisfactory competitive groups," whereas the black
school did not. 274
Eighth, clinical programs also require enough advanced students to supervise beginners. There was an extensive legal aid
program at Texas; it was unclear whether any similar program
existed at Texas State except on paper. 275
In short, the new law school which Texas had created under
the pressure of litigation and to which it proposed to consign
Heman Sweatt and all other prospective black attorneys was
markedly inferior to the long-established and nationally promi2 71. ld. at 42-43, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 323-24. The professors defined
equalization of the collections to mean that Texas State would have the same number of
nonduplicate volumes as did Texas.
272 · ld. at 43, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 324 (footnote omitted). The disparity in
1
acement opportunities was especially important since the assistant dean of the white
aw school had recently warned in an article in the Texas Bar· journal of an impending
oversupply of lawyers in the state.
ld. at 43, reprinted ~n 34 MINN. L. REv. at 324.
· ld. at 44, repnnted zn 34 MINN. L. REv. at 324.
275
· ld., reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 325.
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nent institution which was reserved for whites. Even if the
"mechanical" aspects of the two schools were equal and the new
one for blacks were able to overcome the less tangible disparities
already mentioned, however, the professors contended that
Texas State still would not be equal to The University of Texas.
Inequality would exist because "the segregated plan misses the
whole purpose of a modern law school." 276
The crucial point was that lawyers must understand the communities and the society in which they practice. To this end, they
need to learn their craft and exchange ideas with a representative
group of future practitioners. On this score, the white school
had significant advantages since it would contain a much broader
cross-section of the population than would the black one. By limiting Texas State to blacks, the state was depriving Sweatt of the
chance to exchange ideas "with a complete variety of fellow students."277 This, in turn, would handicap him "in advising clients
or in dealing with attorneys and judges who are a part of the
broad stream of Texas jurisprudence deepened as a result of the
years of group association at the [white] school." 278 Moreover,
Texas State, by its size, could not attract enough good students
or a sufficient diversity of viewpoints and experiences to make for
a truly stimulating educational environment. 279
The Law Teachers concluded their indictment of the state's
approach as follows:
The inescapable inequality of Texas [State] lies in the fact
that legal education is not a mere matter of cubic feet of classroom space, or the possession of a few thousand books, or the
presence offour lawyers recently become teachers. If, instead,
legal education is something alive and vital, if the measure is
not cubic feet of air space but the intellectual atmosphere
within the walls, if law teachers are appraised as individual men
of varying degrees of talent, if education is in large part association, if research and practice are part of the job of legal training, if segregation in law school warps and corrupts the mind
276. Id.
277. Id. at 45, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 326.
Presumably, white students also would suffer from the inability to meet and work
with blacks, although the brief does not explicitly discuss the effects of segregation on
white students at this point. The failure to address this matter undoubtedly was not
intended as a retreat from the professors' earlier argument concerning the adverse societal effects of racial discrimination. See supra text accompanying note 258.
278. Law Teachers Brief, supm note 254, at 46, rep1inted in 34 MINN. L. REv. at 326.
279. Id.
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and personality of man-if any of these things is true, then certainly this Texas Negro institution is a mockery of legal education and of
the equal protection of the laws. 280

3. The State's Position.-Texas argued simply that the constitutionality of segregation had long since been settled by an unbroken line of federal and state judicial decisions dating back
over the previous century and that the lower courts in this case
had correctly found the two law schools to be substantially
equal. 281 Mter listing many of these decisions and reciting language that either expressly endorsed or pretermitted discussion
of the compatibility of segregation with the fourteenth amendment, the state concluded that the prior cases "argue themselves" in support of the propriety of "separate but equal"
educational institutions. 282
280. Id. at 47, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 327 (emphasis added).
281. The 11 states which supported Texas essentially endorsed its argument that the
constitutionality of segregation had been conclusively resolved by Plessy and its progeny.
They disclaimed any interest in the resolution of the factual question of the equality of
the two law schools. States Amicus Brief, supra note 236, at 2. Instead, they emphasized
that segregation laws in at least 17 states and the District of Columbia would be affected
by the result of this case. Id. at 3-5. While conceding that "in some instances schools for
Negroes [may] have fallen below the standards of schools maintained for whites," they
contended that "discrimination is not implicit in separate schools." !d. at 5-6. Then,
relying upon recent journalistic accounts of racial conflict in Northern and border communities, id. at 7-9, these states suggested that the elimination of segregation would
engender widespread violence and the destruction of the public schools. I d. at 10-11.
Although Texas advanced some of the same arguments, it did so in a somewhat
more subtle fashion. See infra note 287 and accompanying text. These states bluntly
raised the prospect of intermarriage in language reminiscent of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals in Berea College and implicit in Justice McReynolds' dissent in Gaines. See supra
notes 64 & 101-102 and accompanying text. In order to put a somewhat better face on
the point, these states suggested that opposition to social commingling existed among
all races:
Experiences of the past have left marks that no laws or court decisions can
era~e ~vernight. It is a mistake for any "observer from afar" to assume that
preJudice and fear against "crossing the line" in intimate social contact are limIted to the Southern white man alone. They exist just as strongly in the average
Negro man of the South. Negro men do not want their daughters, wives, and
sweethearts dancing, dating, and playing with white men any more than white
men want their women folk in intimate social contact with Negro men. "White
trash" is the hated name which Southern Negroes apply to white men who keep
~~e company of their women folk. Worse names are applied to Negro men who
cross t~e line." The result in the South today is almost universal antipathy
toward. mtimate mixed social relationships. The results of the disregard of
t~ese crrcumstances in the past have been tragic to both races, physically, soCially, and politically.
St;tes Am~cus Brief, supra note 236, at 10.
l"d. 8 2. Bnef for Respondents at 42. The state listed all of the cases upholding the va1 Ity of segregated education in an appendix. Id. at 211-23.
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Even if Plessy did not expressly control the case, the state
made two arguments that its underlying principles applied as
strongly to education as to transportation. First, there was ample
evidence that the equal protection clause was not intended to
prohibit segregated schools. 283 Second, and more significantly, it
was apparent that this type of segregation was eminently reasonable.284 In addition to the numerous prior cases supporting that
conclusion, the state cited and discussed a variety of reports, including: (1) dissenting statements in the reports of the President's Commission on Higher Education and the President's
Committee on Civil Rights, (2) the 1944 recommendation of the
Bi-Racial Committee on Education for Negroes in Texas that a
separate university for blacks be established, (3) the results of a
Texas Poll showing overwhelming public endorsement of that
recommendation in preference to desegregating The University
of Texas, 285 and (4) the practice of the Federal Council of
Churches which, despite the position of its amicus brief on behalf
of Sweatt, permitted its members to maintain segregated congregations and educational institutions in the South. 286 Moreover,
there was every reason to believe that desegregation would lead
to serious breaches of the peace and a calamitous decline in popular support for the public schools. 287
Finally, the state maintained that the lower courts' resolution
283. /d. at 43-68.
284. Id. at 76-92.
285. The Texas Poll results showed overwhelming white and narrow black opposition
to desegregating The University of Texas. A large majority of whites and a much
smaller majority of blacks favored instead the creation of an entirely new and separate
university for blacks. !d. at 86. The figures, however, were presented in a rather unhelpful format. The statistical table showed percentages of all respondents rather than
of each racial group.
Further, the brief provides no information concerning the size or method of selection of the sample. Thus, there is no way to assess the reliability of the data. The results
for blacks are likely to be especially questionable since they comprised only 14 percent
of those surveyed. This would be the case even though black interviewers talked with
black respondents in order to encourage those persons to voice their true attitudes. !d.
at 86 n.99. The statistical margin of error for the small subset of black respondents is
likely to be so large as to call into question the accuracy of the results, particularly if the
total number of completed interviews was much below 1,000. For explanation of the
mathematics involved, see H. BLALOCK, JR., SociAL STATISTICS 135-53 (1960); C. MosER,
SURVEY METHODS IN SOCIAL INVESTIGATION 115-21 (1958).
286. Brief for Respondents at 87-88.
287. In support of this argument, Texas cited the discussion of recent episodes of
racial friction outside the South in the amicus brief of the states which endorsed its
position. /d. at 93. Texas also alluded to the dread of social commingling between the
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of the question of the equality of the two law schools could not
be disturbed. Most fundamentally, Texas contended that this issue was not properly before the Court because Sweatt had not
properly raised it in the Court of Civil Appeals. 288 Even if the
Court determined to examine the matter for itself, the record established that Texas State in fact was substantially equal to
Texas. To support this claim, the state reviewed the comparisons
between the two institutions made at trial by Dean McCormick
and Professor Walker, among others. 289 Moreover, since the
original trial, the Texas State University for Negroes, including
its law school, had opened in Houston. The interim law school in
Austin had closed. The permanent law school had been provisionally accredited by the American Bar Association, and its first
graduate had been admitted to the state bar. More than 2,000
races. It did so in a more restrained fashion than had the other states, but the point was
unmistakably clear:
Undoubtedly one of the things which gives rise to the necessity for separation of the races is a historic antipathy of many of both races for a forced close
personal, social contact. Beside the daily association in the classroom, at least
some of which is social, universities and public schools officially maintain and
sponsor extracurricular activities which do involve close personal social contacts. For example, there are school dances, rooms or halls for visiting, dancing, for playing various games, swimming, and so forth. Also connected with
colleges are donnitories where the living together is on a more or less intimate
plane.
!d. at 93-94 (footnote omitted).
288. !d. at l00-07. The Court of Civil Appeals, in denying Sweatt's petition for rehearing, said that its 'jurisdiction in this latter regard was not invoked in this case." 210
S.W.2d at 448. The state based its argument upon this statement. Sweatt's counsel
contended that they had not waived this claim of error in the lower court. See Petitioner's Reply Brief to Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 4-5.
The entire debate on this point may have been academic. The Court of Civil Appeals, after noting Sweatt's supposed procedural blunder, immediately went on to state:
"However, we have carefully considered the evidence from that viewpoint . . . ; and
were our jurisdiction in that regard properly invoked we would be constrained to hold
that its preponderance and overwhelming weight support the trial court's judgment
· · · ·" 210 S.W.2d at 448. As the Supreme Court has explained in a series of habeas
corpus cases, an area in which it has steadfastly refused to consider questions "which
were not resolved on the merits in the state proceeding due to [a party's] failure to raise
them there as required by state procedure," Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977)
(~mp~asis deleted), there is no reason to apply the procedural default doctrine in situa~~~ns In which the state court has addressed the merits of a claim notwithstanding any
~Ilure to comply with applicable state procedural requirements. E.g., Ulster County
v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 149, 152-54 (1979); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536,
5 ~urt
2 n.5 (1976). Since the Court of Civil Appeals affirmatively determined that the two
1
aw schools were equal, there was no reason for the Supreme Court to sidestep the issue.
289. Brief for Respondents at 107-19 .
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students were enrolled in the entirely new university. 290 Thus,
the state obviously was acting in good faith to provide the best
possible education to all of its students. 291
C.

The Position of the Federal Government

The Truman administration played an important role in all
three cases. The United States was a nominal defendant in Henderson. 292 In the district court, the Justice Department represented the ICC. When the case reached the Supreme Court,
however, the Department refused to defend the Commission.
Solicitor General Perlman filed a sixty-six-page brief that began
by confessing error and concluded by calling upon the Court to
repudiate Plessy. 293 This was the first time that the federal government had explicitly urged the abandonment of "separate but
equal. "294
In addition to acknowledging that the railroad's dining car
regulations were unlawful, the administration brief forcibly argued that, contrary to Plessy, "legally-enforced racial segregation
in and of itself constitutes a discrimination and inequality of
treatment," irrespective of the physical equality of the separate
facilities that might be provided. 295 Indeed, where segregation
was officially sanctioned, "the phrase 'separate but equal' is a
plain contradiction in terms." 296 Segregation of blacks was "uni290. !d. at 120-22.
291. /d. at 119.
292. By statute, the United States must be a party to any action brought against the
Interstate Commerce Commission. 28 U.S.C. § 2322 (1982).
293. After explaining the status of the United States as a statutory party, the brief
stated:
Since the United St:Jtes is of the view, however, that the order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission [upholding the railroad's segregated dining car regulation] is invalid, this brief sets forth the grounds upon which it is submitted that
the judgment of the district court is erroneous and should be reversed.
Henderson Brief, supra note 227, at 1-2.
294. Hutchinson, supra note 223, at 18. This was not, however, the first time that the
Truman administration had urged the Court to reject segregation. In the restrictive
covenant cases, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948), Attorney General Clark and Solicitor General Perlman filed a 123-page amicus
curiae brief on behalf of the United States. The first 4 7 pages of that brief described in
detail the operation and deleterious effects of such covenants all over the countrv. For
accounts of the administration's decision to file this brief, seeR. KLUGER, supra note 7, at
252-53; C. VosE, CAUCASIANS ONLY 168-74 (1959).
295. Henderson Brief, supra note 227, at 24.
296. /d. at 34-35.
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versally understood as imposing on them a badge of inferiority.
It 'brands the Negro with the mark of inferiority and asserts that
he is not fit to associate with white people.' " 297 The physical
separation of black diners from whites plainly was designed to
emphasize their subordinate status. 298
Nearly half of the administration brief was devoted to a vigorous attack on Plessy. The government contended that the nondiscrimination provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act rather
than Plessy controlled the case. If "separate but equal" were relevant, then Plessy should be overruled since the legal and factual
assumptions upon which it rested had long since been discredited.299 In somewhat different terms than Marshall's argument in
Sweatt, the government maintained that segregation caused substantial harm to the public interest. That practice limited opportunities for blacks, forced whites to engage in extensive hypocrisy
to justify the practice, promoted mutual suspicion between the
races, and held the country up to condemnation and ridicule in
the international arena. 300 Thus, Plessy was "a constitutional
297. Jd. at 27-28 (footnotes omitted) (quoting PRESIDENT's COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 79 (1947)).
298. Id. at 28-32. The government argued that the statutory requirement of "substantial equality of treatment," Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 ( 1942), went
well beyond the purely physical aspects of dining car service:
Manifestly, colored passengers would be discriminated against if the railroad's
rules required its waiters to say, when serving them: "Don't think, because we
have to serve you, that we believe you're as good as whites." The wrong would
be compounded if a loud-speaking device carried these words to every diner in
the car. But in substance, although the form may have been less offensive,
these were the conditions under which the railroad furnished dining car service
to [such] passengers.
Henderson Brief, supra note 227, at 31-32.
299. Henderson Brief, supra note 227, at 35-49.
According to the government, Plessy rested upon two dubious premises. One was
that officially mandated segregation did not necessarily imply the inferiority of any
group. That proposition was plainly incorrect as a matter of fact in 1950, whatever its
accuracy may have been in 1896. Id. at 40-41 & n.35. The other was that the fourteenth
a~endment protected only civil and political rights but not social equality. The issue in
this case, however, concerned travel for business; the right to "substantial equality of
treatment," McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161 (1914), therefore
could not be dismissed as merely social. Henderson Brief, supm note 227, at 42-43.
300. Henderson Brief, supra note 227, at 49-64. With respect to blacks, the government maintained:
. . Segregation is a dominant factor in every aspect of the Negro's life. It
hmits his physical movements and economic opportunities, and adversely af~ects his personality and social development. It is much more thanjim-crowism
m vehicles and public places. It is an ostracism symbolizing inferiority which
colors his thoughts and action at almost every moment.
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anachronism which no longer deserves a place in our law." 30 1
The government did not rest upon this extraordinary denunciation of Plessy and its insistence that segregation inflicted dignitary injury irrespective of the equality of the separate facilities.
Attorney General McGrath underlined the administration's view
by participating personally at oral argument in support of Henderson.302 Moreover, the administration filed a memorandum as
amicus curiae in Sweatt and lvfcLaurin. Unlike the detailed substantive arguments in the Henderson brief, this memorandum was
largely rhetorical. It began with the statement that "[t]hese cases
. . . test the vitality and strength of the democratic ideals to
which the United States is dedicated," 303 then quoted extensively
from Strauder v. West Virginia 304 and Shelley v. Kraemer, 305 and concluded, echoing the more extensive argument in the Henderson
brief, that Plessy was "wrong as a matter of law, history, and policy" that should be repudiated "as an unwarranted deviation
from the principle of equality under law." 306

D.

The Decision

The Court unanimously favored the civil rights claims in all
three cases. The segregated dining car policy that caused Elmer
!d. at 49-50 (footnote omitted). The brief supported this position with detailed references to a series of medical, psychological, and sociological studies of the deleterious
effects of segregation on black physical and mental health. !d. at 49-55.
Whites suffer guilt and demoralization; the institution of segregation also "promote[s] the master race psychology, thus sowing the seeds for oppressive individual and
collective action." !d. at 56.
As to the harm to the nation as a whole, the government cited another series of
studies condemning segregation:
Experience and informed opinion are in agreement that normal contacts
between the races diminish prejudice while enforced separation intensifies it.
Race relations are improved by living together, working together, serving together, going to school together. The absence of a color line in . . . countries [such
as Brazil] goes far to show that racial prejudice is not instinctive or hereditary,
but is rather kept alive by man-made barriers such as segregation.
!d. at 57 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). This portion of the brief concluded by
listing several recent occasions upon which foreign nations had condemned the United
States for permitting segregation to exist within its borders. !d. at 60-63.
30 I. !d. at 65.
302. Henderson, 339 U.S. at 817, 822-23.
303. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1-2, McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950}, and Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Memorandum].
304. 100 u.s. 303 (1880).
305. 334 U.S. I (1948).
306. Amicus Memorandum, supra note 303, at 9-10.
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Henderson to go hungry was "undue or unreasonable prejudice
or disadvantage" prohibited by section 3(1) of the Interstate
Commerce Act. 307 Since the policy plainly violated the statute,
Justice Burton explained that there was no occasion to "reach the
constitutional or other issues" suggested by the parties. 308 The
state-imposed internal segregation to which George McLaurin
had been subjected "impair[ed] and inhibit[ed] his ability to
study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other
students, and . . . to learn his profession." 309 The state effectively had deprived him of the chance "to secure acceptance by
his fellow students on his own merits. " 310 Thus, as Chief Justice
Vinson put it, Oklahoma had denied him his "personal and present right to the equal protection of the laws." 311 Both opinions
were muted in tone and narrow in substance; both suggested that
these were relatively straightforward cases. 312
The opinion in Sweatt, also written by Vinson, was similarly
brief and to the point. It entirely avoided the constitutional arguments that the parties and amici had energetically pressed. The
third sentence of the opinion read: "Broader issues have been
urged for our consideration, but we adhere to the principle of
deciding constitutional questions only in the context of the particular case before [us]." 313 The balance of the decision focused
upon whether the separate law schools were actually equal.
The Court emphasized the differences between the two institutions, but its analysis bore the unmistakable imprint of the Law
Teachers' amicus brief. After comparing the mechanical aspects
of the interim and permanent Texas State law schools with those
307. Henderson, 339 U.S. at 824-26.
308. !d. at 826.
309. McLaU7in, 339 U.S. at 641.
310. !d. at 642.
311. !d.
312. In fact, the Court had no difficulty agreeing upon the outcome in Henderson and
McLaurin. Hutchinson, supm note 223, at 24-25. There were differences of view, however, as to precisely how to draft the opinions. Some members of the Court, notably
Justice Douglas, wanted to use Hende1·son to overrule Plessy. Others, particularly Justice
Frankfurter, wanted to avoid any premature resolution of the constitutionality of segregated education. In the interest of achieving unanimity, ChiefJustice Vinson and Justice
Burton accommodated most of their colleagues' suggested revisions. !d. at 26-29. They
succeeded at least to the extent that no member of the Court wrote separately; Justice
Douglas, however, concurred only in the result in Henderson. See Henderson, 339 U.S. at
826.
313. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631.
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at The University of Texas, the Chief Justice concluded that the
state had not provided substantial equality of educational opportunity for black and white law students. 314 Beyond the tangible
differences, the white law school "possesse[d] to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but
which make for greatness in a law school," including faculty reputation, alumni influence, and institutional prestige and tradition. 315
No reasonable person who could choose freely between the two
institutions "would consider the question close." 316 Finally, the
white school offered incomparable advantages:
Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose
to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of
ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned. The law school to which Texas is willing to admit
[Sweatt] excludes from its student body members of the racial
groups which number 85% of the population of the State and
includes most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges, and
other officials with whom [he] will inevitably be dealing when
he becomes a member of the Texas Bar. With such a substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered [Sweatt] is substantially equal
to that which he would receive if admitted to the University of
Texas Law SchooP 17

The Court held that Sweatt had a "personal and pres~nt"
right to "legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to
students of other races." 318 Because the separate law school did
not afford him the quality of legal education provided in the allwhite institution, "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that [he] be admitted to the University of
Texas Law School. " 319
This terse holding cannot obscure the breathtakingly broad
implications of the Court's reasoning. "Separate but equal" presumably was still the law, but for the first time the "equal" com314. Id: at 633-34.
315. !d. at 634 (emphasis added).
316. !d. The Chief Justice continued: "It is unlikely that a member of a group so
decisively in the majority, attending a school with rich traditions and prestige which only
a history of consistently maintained excellence could command, would claim that the
opportunities afforded him for legal education were unequal to those" offered to Sweatt.
!d. at 634-35.
317. !d. at 634.
318. !d. at 635.
319. !d. at636.
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ponent of the doctrine was given real bite. The Court refused to
defer to whatever the state had provided in the name of equivalence. Moreover, it adopted a very expansive definition of equality. The Justices could have focused exclusively upon the
physical or mechanical differences between the two law schools.
These differences were obvious but they were not overwhelming.
But the opinion goes well beyond such presumably objective factors to inquire into a broad range of qualitative matters which
affect the evaluation of an institution. This was absolutely unprecedented. Never before had the Court examined the educational process in such detail.
Thus, the Court's refusal to reconsider the validity of Plessy at
least in the context of graduate and professional education could
not be taken as the last word on the subject. After Sweatt, it
seemed that separate law schools could never be equal: if Texas
State, which had been the beneficiary of an apparently sincere
effort to create a respectable and fully accredited institution in
the shortest possible time in the wealthiest state which enforced
segregation, was constitutionally deficient, it was difficult to imagine any alternative that would pass muster. Any new program
or institution for blacks would lack the history, tradition, prestige, and accreditation of any existing one for whites. 320
In short, these rulings cast a long shadow over the "separate
.but equal" doctrine. l'vlcLaurin and Hendenon made plain that
blacks could not be excluded from public places unless separate
facilities were provided for them. And Sweatt made clear that any
~eparate facility would have to satisfy stringent criteria of equalIty. These decisions strongly implied that implementing truly
equal segregated facilities would be enormously expensive, and
perhaps impossible. The cases might be limited to their facts,
but logically there seemed to be no limit to their potential for
undermining segregation. Indeed, a week after the decisions
320 · It does not seem likely that another state could have fared more successfully
·
·
th anT - ··d
N h exas ~ 1 In th1s case. For example, an all-black law school began operations at the
0
rt C~rolma College for Negroes shortly after the decision in Gaines. The state acted
1
vo
and WI·th out any 1mmed1ate
·
·
.· .
1
threat of ht1gat10n.
Nevertheless, a decade later
th untanlv
C
Su~ O~rt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying the analytical model adopted in
1
~· Celd ~hat this school was not equal to the all-white law school at the University of
latt:tr . a:oh~a. Accordingly, the court ordered four black applicants admitted to the
F. 2d ~~~tl(tutJon: and the Supreme Court denied review. McKissick v. Carmichael, 187
4th Cu-.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
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were handed down, Thurgood Marshall wrote to one of his academic legal consultants that the opinions were "replete with road
markings telling us where to go next." 321 It was, to be sure, a
long practical step from universities to elementary schools, but
now it was clear that the Court would have to face the issue.
With the help of the "road markings" in the 1950 trilogy, the
Justices might even be persuaded to jettison Plessy altogether. So
the stage was set for Brown.

E.

Explaining the Decision

The lingering question about the Sweatt opmwn is why the
Court opted for such a broad definition of equality when a narrower one was available. One answer is that a narrower focus
upon purely physical differences might not have produced so
clear a result. In conference following oral argument, Chief Justice Vinson actually favored affirming the judgment of the state
courts. 322 Although at least seven of his colleagues disagreed, 323
and he ultimately not only changed his mind but wrote the opinion, Vinson's initial reaction suggested that a restrictive notion of
equality could promote endless debate. Other factors also may
have pushed the Justices toward their final analysis. For example,
well before the oral argument several members of the Court had
thought carefully about the case. 324 Moreover, Justice Clark, an
alumnus of The University of Texas law school, circulated a
memorandum to his colleagues rejecting the state's position
shortly after the argument. 325 The cumulative effects of the gov321.
322.
323.
324.

Tushnet, supra note 17, at 433.
Hutchinson, supra note 223, at 24-25.
!d. at 24.
Justice Burton's clerks had provided him with three detailed memoranda on
Sweatt, A1cLaurin, and Henderson at least ten days before the argument. Justice Clark, the
recently appointed former Attorney General, also received a detailed memorandum
from his clerk. Finally, William T. Coleman, Jr., clerk to Justice Frankfurter, provided an
extensive analysis of the legal issues for his mentor. See Hutchinson, supra note 223, at
15-16, 19-21.
325. ld. at 21-22. Justice Clark's memorandum suggests that the Law Teachers' Brief
profoundly influenced his thinking about the case. For an edited version of the Clark
memorandum, see id. at 89-90. Justice Clark wrote in part:
[I]t is entirely possible that Negroes in segregated grammar schools . . . would
receive skills in . . . elementary subjects equivalent to those of segregated
white students, assuming equality in the texts, teachers, and facilities.
But it is obvious to me that the same would not apply to graduate schools.
There are many reasons: (1) white schools have higher standing in the community as well as nationally, which means much to the graduate professional man;
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ernment's confession of error and forceful condemnation of segregation in Henderson and the outrageous facts of McLaurin must
have had some impact.
Ultimately, however, the Law Teachers' amicus brief seems
to have shaped the Court's analysis. Because the Court declined
to reach the constitutional issues which formed the centerpiece
of their argument, one might minimize the influence of their
brief. Such a view overlooks the reasoning of the unanimous
opinion delivered by Chief Justice Vinson. This extraordinarily
detailed and subtle analysis of the educational process had no
analogue in the precedents. Both Justice Clark's memorandum
and Sweatt's brief raised some of these issues, but not in detail.326 Only the Law Teachers provided a systematic and sophisticated comparison of the two schools.
While it is impossible to determine the precise effect of the
Law Teachers' submission, well-reasoned amicus briefs have
played a substantial role in several leading cases. 327 There could
(2} the older and larger college has more alumni, which gives the graduate
more professional opportunities; (3} the larger and older school attracts better
professors; (4) competition among schools is much keener in the older and
more established school, thus affording a wider professional competition; (5)
the larger and older institution attracts a cross section of the entire State in its
student body-affords a wider exchange of ideas-and, in the combat of ideas,
~urnishes a greater variety of minds, backgrounds and opinions which is most
ti?portant in the professions; (6) it takes years and years to establish a professwnal school of top rank, affording law reviews, competition, medals, societies,
etc., which a Negro school would never attain; (7) acquaintance is important in
the professions and segregation prevents it, thus depriving the Negro of many
state-wide opportunities. These and other reasons are those which I am sure
have led all but nine of the States to abandon the "separate but equal" doctrine
at the graduate level.
Id. at 89-90.
326. See Hutchinson, supra note 223, at 89-90; supra note 325; Brief for Petitioner at
71-74. Most of the four pages in Sweatt's brief address differences in the physical plant
and the faculty of the two schools. Most of the points which the Court discusses do not
appear at all in Sweatt's brief.
327. Perhaps the two most graphic recent examples of the influence of amicus briefs
~n the decisio.n of important lawsuits have come in the racial disrimination context. In
C objones Umv. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Court appointed William T.
d ole~an,Jr., to argue as amicus curiae in support of an Internal Revenue Service policy
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. !d. at 576; 456 U.S.
9. ~~Ytng
(1982). The Court acted after the Reagan administration reversed the long-stand~ng :ederal position on this issue and urged that the case be dismissed as moot. For the
~~~?ground to the Coleman appointment, see 461 U.S. at 585 n.9; The Supreme Court,
-Term, 97 HARV. L. REv. 70, 262-63 n.l5 (1983).
The other recent racial discrimination case in which an amicus brief played a signifi~~nt role is Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in which at least
such briefs were submitted. !d. at 268 n. *. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court
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be no doubt of the quality of the work that went into this particular brief. Most of the historical materials were drawn from an
article that had appeared in the Columbia Law Review, 328 and the
elaborate comparisons of the two schools involved these eminent
professors in the sorts of analyses of curricular, personnel, and
administrative matters with which they were continuously concerned.329 Although the record contained ample evidence supinvalidating a preferential admissions program for minority applicants to the medical
school of the University of California at Davis relied heavily upon a brief submitted on
behalf of Columbia, Harvard, and Stanford Universities and the University of Pennsylvania in concluding that Davis could have adopted a more flexible approach similar to
that used at Harvard College. !d. at 316-19 (opinion of Powell, j.) (citing Brief for Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, as Amici Curiae).
Cases arising in other contexts also reflect the influence of amici. In Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states. This required the partial overruling ofWolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), something which
the Court conceded had been urged upon it only by the American Civil Liberties Union
as amicus curiae. 367 U.S. at 646 n.3. Surprisingly, the appellant had not even cited
IJ!olf, and the amicus brief simply requested the overruling without detailed argumentation in support of that position. !d. at 674 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the Court invalidated an ordinance
that made persons who had been convicted of certain offenses liable for misdemeanor
prosecution if they failed to register with the police upon their arrival in Los Angeles.
The amicus curiae brief of Warren M. Christopher, whom the Court had invited to participate on behalf of the appellant, 354 U.S. 936 (1957), apparently dominated the consideration and decision of the case. See Packer, Mens Rea and the SupTeme GouT!, 1962 SuP.
CT. REv. 107, 129.
In J\1cCollum, supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text, Justice Frankfurter reportedly relied heavily upon an amicus brief submitted by the American Jewish Congress, the Synagogue Council of America, and other Jewish organizations. See Harper &
Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, I 01 U. PA. L. REV. 1172, 1174 (1953); Krislov, The
Amicw Curiae B1·iej: hom Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE LJ. 694, 711 (1963).
328. See Frank & Munro, The 01iginal Undentanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws. ·· 50
CoLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950). For a comparison of the use of the historical materials in
the Law Teachers' Brief and in this article, see infra note 330.
329. A number of members of the Committee were active in the Association of American Law Schools, one of the principal accrediting agencies in the field of legal education. The Texas State law school received prompt approval from two other bodies, the
American Association of Law Libraries and the American Bar Association, within a year
of the opening of its permanent facilities in Houston. See 0. JoHNSON, supra note 19, at
103-05, 108, 154. The AALS deferred action on the school's application for accreditation at its December 1949 meeting because of the pendency of the Supreme Court appeal in Sweatt. This deferral gave rise to widely conflicting interpretations. Compm"l' Biief
for Respondents at 121 (arguing that Texas State actually satisfied all AALS criteria for
accreditation) with Supplement to Law Teachers Brief (contending that AALS had taken
no position on Texas State's compliance with accreditation criteria). The dean of the
black law school suggested that the interest of the Committee in ending segregation led
those of its members who held influential positions in the AALS to seek improperly to
prevent or delay his institution's accreditation. See 0. JoHNSON, supra note 19, at 126-31.
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porting the expansive conception of equality for which they
argued, and while Sweatt's counsel could have devoted more attention to the point, the suggestions of the prestigious and presumably disinterested Law Teachers Committee undoubtedly
appeared to have come from impartial observers. 330 That, in
turn, may have made this approach more acceptable to at least
some members of the Court.
Finally, larger historical developments and broader social
changes may have made the Court more sensitive to the issues
presented in the case. First, the case arose shortly after the end
of World War II, in which the nation had defeated a regime
based upon an unimaginably virulent strain of racism. Parties in
a number of discrimination cases heard during this era made this
330. The Law Teachers Committee may not in fact have been disinterested in the
outcome. The group was created at the initiative of Sweatt's attorneys, who felt that
sound strategic considerations dictated the tactic. See R. KLUGER, supm note 7, at 275.
On the disinterestedness of professors in the public arena, see D. MoYNIHAN, MAXIMUM
FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING 167-205 (1968);]. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 47-63
(1975).
The treatment of some of the historical materials in the Law Teachers Brief illustrates some of the perils of combining the writing of court papers and the writing of
history. See genemlly Kelly, Clio and the Cow·t: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 119,
155-58. In their brief, the professors argued that Congress intended to outlaw segregation in education when it approved the fourteenth amendment. Law Teachers Brief,
supra note 254, at 5-11, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 292-97. The article which provided the basis for much of this part of the brief, however, concluded that there could be
"substantial difference of opinion concerning the dominant intent of the reconstruction
dec~de as to mixed schools." Frank & Munro, supm note 328, at 155; see also Bickel, The
Ongznal Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 59 (1955); Kelly, The
Fow·teenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1049, 108586 (1956). But cf. R. BERGER, supra note 10, at 117-33 (Congress plainly did not intend
t~ prohibit separate schools). In fairness, however, it should be noted that the concluswns of the brief and the article do not differ meaningfully. Compare Law Teachers Brief,
supra note 254, at 10-11, reprinted in 34 MINN. L. REV. at 296-97 ("we do not have complete evidence" of views of framers, but "dominant opinion" was that equal protection
~ause of fourteenth amendment ~l~minated all race~based leg~l distincti~ns), with Frank
f 7unro, supra note 328, at 162 ( 'rt was accepted VIrtually umnamously by supporters
0
ouneenth amendment that equal protection clause "forbade segregated schools").
_Finally, the dean of the black law school implied that some members of the Commit~e Improperly prevented the Association of American Law Schools from approving
exas State's application for accreditation in 1949. See supm note 329. This claim, of
course, goes to the heart of the Committee's disinterestedness.
St

More

r~cently, some black critics

have charged that opponents of accrediting Texas

of~e acted m bad faith because they did not challenge the credentials of The University
Th ~xas and other white law schools. See, e.g., O.jOHNSON, supra note 19, at 134;Jones,
O~n~~as Southern Univmity School of Lmr-The Beginning, 4 TEx. S.U.L. REv. 197, 207
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point with greater or lesser degrees of subtlety. 331 The Court
undoubtedly was aware of the acerbic criticism that greeted its
wartime decisions upholding the internment of hundreds of
thousands of Japanese-Americans. 332 Justice Jackson had been
chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trial, a role he described as "the most important, enduring, and constructive work
333
of my life."
Thus, the Court as an institution was more aware
than ever before of the inconsistency between racial discrimination and the American creed. 334
331. For example, the NAACP explicitly drew the connection between the fight
against Nazism abroad and ~acism a.t home in a 1946 case that successfully challenge.d a
state law requiring segregatiOn on Interstate as well as intrastate trains. The orgamzation concluded its brief with the fo!!owing observation:
Today we are just e.merging from a war in which all of the people of the United
States were joined m a death struggle against the apostles of racism. We have
already recognized by solemn subscription to the Charter of the United Nations
. . . our duty, along with our neighbors, to eschew racism in our national life
and to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion." How much clearer, therefore, must it be today . . . that the national
business of inter~ tate c?mmer.ce is not to be disfigured by disruptive local practices bred of raCial notwns ahen to our national ideals and to the solemn undertakings of the community of civilized nations as weiJ.
Brief for Appellant at 28, Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
In the three 1950 cases, the federal government also emphasized that racial dis~rim
ination was inconsistent with basic American values and with the countrv's internallonal
obligations. Attorney General McGI-ath made this point at oral argume~t. 18 U.~.L'Y·
3277 (1950). The government's written submissions developed this contentiOn m
greater detail. Henderson Brief, supra note 227, at 60-63; Amicus Memorandum, supra
note 303, at 12-13.
332. The decisions were Ex pm·te Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). On
the contemporary criticism, see, e.g., Rostow, The japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54
YALE LJ. 489 (1945).
Whatever the reason, the Court's decisions during the post-War period in cases
involving claims of discrimination against japanese-Americans certainly reflect greater
sensitivity to the evils of race and nationality-based prejudice than did the war-time r~tl
ings. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. Califorma,
332 u.s. 633 (1948).
The Court also decided a number of other important racial discrimination cases
favorably to civil rights claimants during these years. E.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
( 1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I ( 1948); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333
U.S. 28 (1948); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
333. Shawcross, Robert H. jacksons Contributions Dwing the Numnberg Trial, in MR. JusTICE jACKSON: FouR LECTURES IN His HoNoR 87, 90 (1969); accm·d E. GERHART,
AMERICA's AnvocATE: RoBERT H. jACKSON 228 ( 1958).
334. One other factor may have made the Court marginally more sensitive to the
pernicious effects of racial discrimination. In 194 7 jackie Robinson became the first
black major league baseball player in this century. He emerged as an immediate star.
More significantly, his success paved the way for several other black players and may
have helped to break down some forms of discrimination in public accommodations and
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Moreover, the post-War years were a time of greatly increased
public concern with education. President Truman established a
Commission on Higher Education which, in five volumes of reports and recommendations, proposed a vastly expanded network of postsecondary institutions that would receive substantial
financial support from the federal government. 335 Further, the
GI Bill336 enabled more than two million veterans to obtain
higher education that many otherwise could not have afforded.
Leading educators publicly stated that these students as a group
were the most promising ever to attend American colleges and
universities. 337 Below the college level, there was widespread apprehension that the nation's elementary and secondary schools
faced serious shortages of money and staff. Thus, strong bipartisan support for federal aid to education emerged in Congress. In
the spring of 1948, the Senate passed legislation providing such
assistance for the first time in sixty years. 338 In other words, at
~he very time that Sweatt was pending before the Court, there was
unprecedented popular concern with educational quality and
with the benefits that the nation could realize from improvements
in schooling at all levels. This b,roadly increased awareness may
well have affected the Court's perception of the issues in the case,
if only subconsciously.
None of these background factors can detract from the magnitude of the achievement of Thurgood Marshall and the other
attorneys who represented Sweatt. As Pasteur was fond of saying
339
in another context, "[C]hance favors only the prepared mind."
However propitious the circumstances may appear in retrospect,
only superior lawyers who were willing to invest the necessary
time and energy could have taken advantage of a favorable opto improve racial attitudes among some whites. See j. TYGIEL, BASEBALL'S GREAT EXPERIMENT 343-44 (1983). It is impossible to assess the independent effect of this factor. In
any event, such matters are not supposed to influence Supreme Court decisions. But see
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-64 (1972).
335. See PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1948).
336. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, tit. II, 58 Stat. 284, 287-91.

337. See D. RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE 12-15 (1983) .
. 338. The Senate bill ultimately was defeated in the House due to acrimony over the
mclusion of religious schools as beneficiaries of federal largesse. That issue prevented
the enactment of any similar program for years thereafter. See id. at 26-42.
339. R. Dusos, Lours PASTEUR: FREE LANcE oF SciENCE 101 (1960).
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portunity. And as we have noted already, when the case began
the circumstances seemed anything but promising.
V.

The Impact of the Decision

The immediate effects of the Sweatt decision were somewhat
mixed. In the narrowest terms, the ruling involved only one
plaintiff and one law school. It did not prevent further litigation
over the desegregation of other state colleges in Texas. 340 Nor
did its apparently unambiguous emphasis upon true equality
keep other states from continuing vigorously to resist the admission of blacks to theretofore all-white institutions of higher learning. Perhaps the most egregious evaswn involved Virgil
Hawkins, who applied to the University of Florida law school in
the spring of 1949 and gave up the effort after nine years of obstructionist maneuvers by state officials up to and including the
governor. 341 Other states also desegregated their universities
only under federal court order. 342 Violent resistance often accompanied the implementation of those orders. 343
340. See Shipp v. White, 5 Race Rei. L. Rep. 740 (N.D. Tex. 1960) (West Texas State
College); White v. Smith, 1 Race Rei. L. Rep. 324 (W.D. Tex. 1955) (Texas Western
College); Atkins v. Matthews, 1 Race Rei. L. Rep. 323 (E.D. Tex. 1955) (North Texas
State College).
341. For the sordid details of this story, see Cooper, Bmwn v. Board of Education and
Virgil Darnell Haw him[:] Twenty-Eight Year.< and Si.x Petitiom to Justice, 64 J. NEGRO HrsT. 1
(1979); Paulson & Hawkes, Desegregating the University of Florida Law School: Virgil Hawhins
v. The Florida Board oJConlTol, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 59 (1984).
Cooper's title is somewhat misleading. The six petitions referred to there included
only those Hawkins filed with the Supreme Court of Florida; he also submitted four to
the Supreme Court of the United States. One of those resulted in an order that appeared to direct his admission. Florida ex Tel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413
(1956) (per curiam). The state managed to place additional obstacles in his path, however, and Hawkins eventually took his degree at an out-of-state school. In November
1976, more than a quarter-century after he applied to the University of Florida, Virgil
Hawkins became a member of the Florida bar.
342. See, e.g., Gantt v. Clemson Agric. College, 320 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1963); Holmes
v. Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Ga. 1961). The experiences of Hamilton Holmes and
Charlayne Hunter, the first blacks to enroll at the University of Georgia, are described in
C. TRJLLIN, supra note 20. Holmes was elected to Phi Beta Kappa in his senior year. !d.
at 179.
343. The most notorious episodes occurred in Alabama and Mississippi. In 1955
Autherine Lucy was admitted to the University of Alabama pursuant to a federal court
order but was suspended and later expelled after riots broke out on campus. See Lucy v.
Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala.) (ordering Ms. Lucy's admission to the university},
ajfd per wriam, 228 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956); Lucy v.
Adams, I Race Rei. L. Rep. 323 (N.D. Ala. 1956) (ordering Ms. Lucy readmitted but
refusing to hold defendants in contempt); I Race Rei. L. Rep. 456 (order of board of
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Indeed, the decision in Sweatt did not even stop the practice of
providing scholarships for blacks to pursue advanced training at
out-of-state universities. That practice continued for nearly a
generation after Gaines purportedly invalidated it in 1938. For
example, Fred D. Gray, the current president of the National Bar
Association, received his law degree in 1954from Case Western
Reserve University because his native Alabama preferred to give
him a scholarship to study outside the state rather than provide
any form of legal education for blacks within its own borders. 344
And as late as 1963, Georgia spent nearly $450,000 on such outof-state scholarships even after the University of Georgia had
been desegregated by federal court order. 345
But Sweatt had much more than nominal significance. As a
practical matter, it greatly facilitated the demise of segregation in
trustees expelling her because of "baseless, outrageous and unfounded charges of misconduct" against university officials); Lucy v. Adams, 2 Race Rei. L. Rep. 350 (N.D. Ala.
1957) (upholding expulsion order).
It took another court order and the deployment of federal troops nearly eight years
later to enroll another black student in the university. See Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp.
79 (N.D. Ala. I965); United States v. Wallace, 2I8 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ala. I963); Proclamation 3542, 3 C.F.R. 292 ( I959-1963 Comp.); Exec. Order II, Ill, 3 C.F.R. 771 ( 19591963 Comp.); Govemor's Proclamation ofjune II, I963, 8 Race Rei. L. Rep. 457; Radio
and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights, PUBLIC PAPERS OF PRESIDENT jOHN F. KENNEDY 468 (1963).
Beforejames Meredith was enrolled at the University of Mississippi, the state's two
highest elected officials were held in contempt of court, several thousand federal troops
and U.S. marshals were deployed on campus, and two persons were killed in rioting. See
Meredith v. Fair, 328 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. I962) (en bane) (holding governor in contempt); Meredith v. Fair, 328 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. I962) (en bane) (holding lieutenant
governor in contempt). For an account of the entire episode by a member ofthe university's faculty, see J. SILVER, MISSISSIPPI: THE CLOSED SociETY 107-40 (I964). See also
l'v~eredith v. Fair, 328 F.2d 586, 588-89 (5th Cir. I962) (en bane) (denying motion to
dissolve temporary restraining order against state and university officials and to dismiss
contempt citations); Proclamation 3497, 3 C.F.R. 2254 (I959-l963 Comp.); Exec. Order
11,053,3 C.F.R. 645 (1959-1963 Comp.); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388U.S. 130, I404l, 159 n.22 (1967) (describing events that gave rise to libel suit by retired Gen. Edwin
Walker in connection with his appearance near campus at the time of disturbances).
344. Two Bar A·esidents, IN BRIEF, Sept. I985, at 9, 9 (alumni magazine of the Case
':Yes tern Reserve University School of Law). The out-of-state scholarship program contmued even after Gray graduated. See Lucy v. Adams, I34 F. Supp. 235, 238 (N.D. Ala.),
a.ffdpercuriam, 228 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 35I U.S. 931 (1956).
. Gray returned to Alabama with his law degree and became a very successful civil
nghts lawyer whose efforts went a long way toward undermining segregation there. He
~?ued successfully as lead co-counsel in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (I960).
f IS other clients have included Rosa Parks, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the NAACP,
r;~~om riders, sit-in demonstrators, and the students who desegregated the University
0
abama and the Macon County public schools.
34 5. C. TRILL!N, supra note 20, at 48-49.
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universities and graduate and professional schools. By the fall of
1950, more than 1,000 blacks were attending classes in previously all-white institutions without noticeable incident. 346 More
generally, Sweatt may have presaged closer judicial review of all
educational issues. Since 1950, the Supreme Court has decided a
wide array of cases dealing with academic matters. The results
do not conform to any particular philosophical pattern, but they
do share one common characteristic. Whatever the outcome on
the merits, the Court generally has carefully and explicitly taken
account. of the special place of education in American society in
considering whether the governmental regulation in question
passes muster. This has been true· in cases concerning the constitutional status of public education, 347 the first amendment rights
of teachers, 348 the speech and associational rights of students, 349
control over curricular content, 350 policies for removing books
from schoollibraries, 351 procedures for disciplining and removing students from the classroom, 352 and the liability of school officials for violations of students' rights. 353 One ought not
overstate this point because the Court has never cited Sweatt
outside the equal protection context. Nonetheless, the analysis
of the educational issues in that case marked something of an
intellectual Rubicon for the Court; after crossing it, the Justices
may have found more careful analysis of such issues to be progressively easier.
346. Ransmeier, The Fourteenth Amendment and the "Sepamte but Equal" Doctrine, 50
MICH. L. REv. 203, 240-41 (1951); Taylor, The Demise of Race Distinctions in Graduate Education, 1 DUKE B.J. 135, 150-52 (1951).
347. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-23 (1982); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973).
348. E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,486-87 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 129-32
(1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion); id. at
261-63 (Frankfurter,]., concurring in the result); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S.
551, 558-59 (1956).
349. E.g., Healy v.James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81, 185-94 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Commun. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07, 512-13 (1969).
350. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-09 (1968).
351. Board of Educ v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864, 866, 868 (1982) (plurality opinion).
352. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 106 S. Ct., 507,511-15 (1985) (substantive standard for academic dismissal); Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84-91
(1978) (procedural standard for academic dismissal); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
660-63 (1977) (imposition of corporal punishment); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 57476, 580 (1975) (procedural standard for disciplinary suspension).
353. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318-22 (1975).
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Ultimately, however, the significance of Sweatt should be assessed in the context in which it arose. The case was part of a
concerted litigation strategy designed to overturn segregation. It
was tried and argued on the theory that no separate black law
school could possibly be equal to an all-white institution. Consequently, the Supreme Court decision dealt a crippling blow to
"separate but equal" educational programs. Read literally, the
ruling applied only to a pair of law schools. As a matter of logic,
however, it seemed to contain no limiting principle. Viewed
strictly in those terms, Brown seemed almost an a fortiori case in
which the result flowed inexorably from that in Sweatt.
To appreciate the intimate logical connection between the
two decisions, one must understand that Sweatt rested upon three
central propositions. The first was that the intangible differences
between the two law schools rendered them intrinsically unequal.
The second was that race-based enrollment restrictions rendered
the black school an academic vacuum which limited the interplay
of ideas and the exchange of views. The third was that, whatever
the official rationale, segregation constituted a formal statement
that blacks were unworthy of full membership in the community.
All of these propositions applied with great force not only to law
schools, but at all levels of education. Thus, however narrowly
the Court phrased its ruling, the result could plausibly be interpreted as the death knell of segregated schooling. 354
The lawyers for the NAACP, however, correctly believed that
. 354. Some contemporaneous co~mentators believed that Sweatt and IV!cLaurin effect~vely had invalidated all forms of educational segregation. See., e.g., Note, Equal Educatz.onal Facilities Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 WASH •
U.L.Q 594, 615 (Sweatt "did in effect overrule [the Plessy] doctrine by implying that no
constitutional equality can exist where one is compelled by state law to study in an 'academic vacuum'"); 3 ALA. L. REv. 181, 182 (1950) ("a careful reading of the cases indicates most decidedly that the attitude of the Court must be interpreted definitely to be
that segregation is unconsitutional per se ").
Others believed that the Court essentially had ended segregation at the graduate
an~ professional level while leaving the way open to extend its. ruling to colleges and
ultimately to lower levels of the educational ladder. See, e.g., Hyman, Segregation and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REV. 555, 560-61 (1950); Roche, Education, Segregation
and the Supreme Court-A Political Analysis, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 952-53 (1951); Waite,
The Negro in the Supreme Court: Five }:;ears ldore, 35 MINN. L. REV. 625, 639 (1951); The
Suprem~ Court, 1949 Term, 64 HARV. L. REv. 114, 130-31 (1950). Many regarded this
extensiOn as all but inevitable. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Negro and the Law in the United
~tales, 14 Moo. L. REV. 446, 461 (1951); Note, The Fall of an Unconstitutional Fiction-The
Separate but Equal" Doctrine, 30 NEB. L. REV. 69, 82 (1951); 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 555, 559
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the Court would not regard the constitutionality of segregation
at the elementary and secondary level as so straightforward a
matter. 355 The intangible factors which occupied so prominent a
place in Sweatt seemed less important in the context of grade
schools, while the number of persons directly affected by desegregation at that level was much larger. Accordingly, the lawyers
refined and amplified the arguments that they introduced in
Sweatt as the grade school cases made their way up to the
Supreme Court. The expectation that these cases would prove
more difficult was borne out in the event: the Justices struggled
through two rounds of briefing and oral argument before reaching their unanimous decision in Brown. 356 In doing so, they accepted each of the propositions that formed the basis of Sweatt. 357
Therefore, they concluded that "[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal," 358 and that any system of state-imposed
segregation necessarily violates the fourteenth amendment. 359
In a very real sense, then, Sweatt converted the demise of Plessy
from a long-range dream to a substantiallikelihood. 360
(1951); 39 GEo. LJ. 145, 148 (1950); 36 VA. L. REv. 797,800 (1950); 8 WAsH. & LEE L.
REV. 54, 54 (1951).
A few commentators, mostly from the South, suggested that segregation might remain permissible below the college and university level, at least so long as the states
made good faith efforts to equalize black schools. Significantly, several of these writers
endorsed the Court's rulings; none criticized the decisions. See, e.g., Note, Implications of
Recent Cases an Education of Minority Racial Groups, 3 U. FLA. L. REV. 358, 367 (1950); 2
MERCER L. REV. 272, 273 (1950); 5 MIAMI L.Q 150, 152-53 (1950).
355. SeeR. KLUGER, supra note 7, at 284, 290-94; Frank, supra note 253, at 42.
356. Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483,488-89 (1954). See generally R. KLUGER,
supm note 7, at 543-699.
357. Brown v. Board ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954).
358. !d. at 495.
359. For the same reasons, segregation instituted by the federal government was held
to violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
360. Although Brawn ultimately resolved the constitutionality of segregation, Sweatt
has retained independent signficance. Most recently, for example, it was the principal
authority upon which Justice Powell relied for the proposition that the goal of achieving
a diverse student body is a permissible basis for educational institutions to consider race
as one factor in determining which applicants to admit to their programs. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,313-14 (1978) (opinion of Powell,]., announcing the judgment).
Interestingly, Sweatt is not mentioned in any of the opinions in Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), a 5-to-4 decision in which the Court held that a
state could not operate a nursing school for women only. It is at least possible that the
analysis employed in Sweatt might have helped to clarify some of the questions at issue in
Hagan.
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VI.

Epilogue
Heman Marion Sweatt never became a lawyer. He entered
The University ofTexas pursuant to the Supreme Court decision
vindicating his "personal and present" right to legal education.361 Later on he dropped out, although he almost certainly
would have graduated from Texas State. 362 That black college,
its name changed to Texas Southern University, 363 has survived
its clouded origins and attained modest academic respectability.364 Its law school, despite repeated reports of its impending
demise, 365 has produced the majority of black attorneys in the
state. 366 Finally, in the ultimate irony of a case in which that quality abounds, in 1976 the institution that Sweatt refused to enter
was renamed the Thurgood Marshall School of Law, in honor of
a man who had spent the better part of four years as Sweatt's
attorney trying to make sure that the infant institution would be
still born. 367

361. 339 U.S. at 635.
362. See 0. JoHNSON, supra note 19, at 173; L. MILLER, supra note 9, at 341; cf supra
n?tes 103-105 & 113-115 and aocompanying text (concerning Uoyd Gaines and Ada
S1puel Fisher).
363. Act of April 20, 1951, ch. 65, § 1, 1951 Tex. Gen. Laws 109.
364. Texas Southern University is one of a handful of colleges "[a]t the head of the
~egro academic procession . . . [which] would probably fall near the middle of the nal!onal academic procession." C. JENCKS & D. RIESMAN, THE AcADEMIC REVOLUTION 433
(Anchored. 1969).
365. See id. at 437; 0. JoHNSON, supra note 19, at 175; cf Frank, supra note 253, at 33
(because of prior discrimination, blacks admitted to white law schools have high rate of
academic difficulty, in turn giving inadequate black schools continued vitality).
366. See Washington, History and the Role of Black Law Schools, 5 N.C. CENT. LJ. 158,
i72 0974); cf King, The Case for the Black Law School: The Texas Southern University Story, I
EX. S.U. INTRA. L. REv. 73 (1970) (continuing need for black law schools).
367. See Symposium, 4 TEX. S.U.L. REv. I (1977).

